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I. ADDRESSING OVERDOSE AND ASSOCIATED DRUG HARMS:
MORE TOOLS NEEDED
The United States is experiencing a historic crisis of opioid-related harms.1 The rate of fatal overdoses has tripled since 1999, driven
primarily by opioids.2 Spurred by large numbers of new initiates, the incidence of injection-related infections like HIV is now rapidly rising.3
Despite concerted policymaker attention and the investment of more than
ten billion dollars from all levels of government and civil society, 4 the
rate of opioid-related harms remains at astronomically high levels.5 With

1

See David C. Perlman & Ashley E. Jordan, The Syndemic of Opioid Misuse, Overdose, HCV,
and HIV: Structural-Level Causes and Interventions, 15 CURRENT HIV/AIDS REP. 96, 96
(2018) (describing the opioid crisis as a syndemic of interrelated epidemics of opioid use,
overdose, and opioid-related disease transmission occurring within communities already
struggling with structural conditions of inequality).
2
See HOLLY HEDEGAARD, MARGARET WARNER & ARIALDI M. MINIÑO, DRUG OVERDOSE
DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016, at 1 (2017) (noting increases in drug overdose
deaths involving natural and semisynthetic opioids in recent years).
3
In 2015, new HIV diagnoses attributed to injection drug use increased for the first time in
two decades. HIV Diagnoses, CDC NCHHSTP ATLASPLUS, https://gis.cdc.gov
/grasp/nchhstpatlas/charts.html [https://perma.cc/K7PB-U6FC] (change the Year field to
“2015” and the Transmission Category field to “Injection drug use”). Rates returned to lower
levels in 2016 and 2017, but dramatic increases are emerging in specific settings. See, e.g.,
Health Advisory, Phila. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, HIV Outbreak Among People Who Inject
Drugs (PWID) (Oct. 16, 2019) (reporting a 115% increase in new HIV diagnoses among
people who inject drugs from 2016 to 2018); see also Philip J. Peters et al., HIV Infection
Linked to Injection Use of Oxymorphone in Indiana, 2014–2015, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229,
230-38 (describing an HIV epidemic in Indiana caused by high-risk use of injectable oxymorphone). The number of new HCV infections reported to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) has tripled in the last five years. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL VIRAL HEPATITIS ACTION PLAN 2017–2020 (2017) (noting that
hepatitis C infections increased nearly 300% from 2010 to 2015).
4
See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., TRACKING FEDERAL FUNDING TO COMBAT THE OPIOID CRISIS
5 (2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Tracking-Federal-Funding-to-Combat-the-Opioid-Crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3LB-L8LU] (estimating that nearly
$11 billion in federal funding has been directed to the opioid crisis in 2017 and 2018).
5
The rate of overdose deaths related to heroin or other commonly prescribed opioids reached
and then stabilized at 5.2 deaths per 100,000 individuals between 2015 and 2017. Overdose
Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/FM5P-REYL] (last updated Jan.
2019). The rate for fentanyl-related overdoses continues to rise with the most recent data
suggesting 9.0 deaths per 100,000 individuals. Id.
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nearly 200 people in the United States dying of overdose every day, hundreds of preventable HIV infections, and countless other avoidable
harms,6 progress is far too slow.
There have been both successes and failures in prevention
measures deployed to date. Broadening access to naloxone, lowering barriers to Opioid Agonist Therapy (OAT), and adopting 911 Good Samaritan Laws have contributed to declines in overdoses and other opioidrelated harms.7 Broader structural interventions to improve overall access to health care, including Medicaid expansion, have also helped.8 Evidence of the benefits of supply-reduction efforts, including prescription
6

Every day, over 130 people die in the United States due to opioid overdose. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.cc/T9VF-3B6Z] (last updated Jan. 2019). With increased injection
drug use comes increased spread of infections like HIV and hepatitis C. Id.
7
See Rahi Abouk, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & David Powell, Association Between State Laws
Facilitating Pharmacy Distribution of Naloxone and Risk of Fatal Overdose, 179 [J]AMA
INTERNAL MED. 805, 809 (2019) (finding that states adopting naloxone access laws granting
direct authority to pharmacists experienced statistically significant declines in fatal opioidrelated overdoses); Lisa Chimbar & Yvette Moleta, Naloxone Effectiveness A Systematic
Review, 29 J. ADDICTIONS NURSING 167, 167 (2018) (“[T]here is overwhelming support of
[sic] take-home naloxone programs being effective in preventing fatal opioid overdoses.”);
Christopher Keane, James E. Egan & Mary Hawk, Effects of Naloxone Distribution to Likely
Bystanders: Results of an Agent-Based Model, 55 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 61, 61 (2018) (“Community-based naloxone distribution to reverse opioid overdose may significantly reduce
deaths.”); Chandler McClellan et al., Opioid-Overdose Laws Association with Opioid Use
and Overdose Mortality, 86 J. ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 90, 90 (2018) (“[L]aws designed to increase layperson engagement in opioid-overdose reversal were associated with reduced opioid-overdose mortality.”); Holly Nguyen & Brandy R. Parker, Assessing the Effectiveness of
New York’s 911 Good Samaritan Law—Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 58 INT’L J.
DRUG POL’Y 149, 149 (2018) (“Accidental heroin overdose emergency department visits and
inpatient hospital admissions increased in New York State after the enactment of the 911
GSL, consistent with the intended effect of the GSL.”); Daniel I. Rees et al., With a Little
Help from My Friends: The Effects of Good Samaritan and Naloxone Access Laws on Opioid-Related Deaths, 62 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2019) (“[T]he estimated effects of GSLs on opioid-related mortality are consistently negative but not statistically significant[, and] adoption
of an NAL is associated with a statistically significant 9–10 percent reduction in opioidrelated mortality.”); Robert P. Schwartz et al., Opioid Agonist Treatments and Heroin Overdose Deaths in Baltimore, Maryland, 1995–2009, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 917, 917 (2013)
(“[S]tarting in 2000 expansion of opioid agonist treatment was associated with a decline in
overdose deaths. Adjusting for heroin purity and the number of methadone patients, there
was a statistically significant inverse relationship between heroin overdose deaths and patients treated with buprenorphine.”).
8
See Alana Sharp et al., Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Access to Opioid Analgesic Medications and Medication-Assisted Treatment, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 642, 642–46 (2018)
(finding that “per-enrollee rates of buprenorphine and naltrexone prescribing increased more
than 200% after states expanded eligibility, while increasing by less than 50% in states that

66

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[November 2019

limits, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) authorizations
and mandates, and drug interdiction enforcement is far less clear.9
Legal barriers—or politico-legal barriers10—have stymied adoption of additional measures that have successfully reduced opioid-related
harms, like fatal overdose, in other countries. These include Safe Consumption Facilities (SCF), Injectable Opioid Agonist Therapy (iOAT),
rapid access to agonist therapy in pharmacies, correctional programs, and
prescription status of essential medicines.11 Efforts to make these measures

did not expand . . . [and] per-enrollee rates of Medicaid-reimbursed MAT increased significantly
more in expansion states.”); see also Hefei Wen et al., Impact of Medicaid Expansion on
Medicaid-covered Utilization of Buprenorphine for Opioid Use Disorder Treatment,
55 J. MED . CARE 336, 336 (2017) (“State implementation of Medicaid expansions in
2014 was associated with a 70% increase in Medicaid-covered buprenorphine prescriptions and a 50% increase . . . in buprenorphine spending.”).
9
See, e.g., Leo Beletsky, Deploying Prescription Drug Monitoring to Address the Overdose
Crisis: Ideology Meets Reality, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 140-78 (2018) (providing a
narrative review of the evidence on prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs)); S.C.
Brighthaupt et al., Effect of Pill Mill Laws on Opioid Overdose Deaths in Ohio & Tennessee:
A Mixed-Methods Case Study, 126 PREVENTIVE MED. 1, 3 (2019) (suggesting that pill mill
laws had no effect on overdose rates in Ohio or Tennessee); see also Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo
Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1, 3 (2019) (suggesting that pill mill laws had no effect on
overdose rates in Ohio or Tennessee); see also Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel
Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–83 (2018) (noting that supply-side interventions have had small, if
any, effects on population-level opioid-related harms).
10
See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public
Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 1089, 1121–24
(2009) (noting that the decision to rely on drug control statutes in frustrating evidence-based
public health interventions like Supervised Consumption Facilities is inflected by politics
and not driven by the underlying intent of legislators who crafted the statutes).
11
See, e.g., Kevin Fiscella, Sarah E. Wakeman & Leo Beletsky, Buprenorphine Deregulation
and Mainstreaming Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder, X the X-Waiver, 76 [J]AMA
PSYCHIATRY 229, 229-30 (2019) (describing the decline in death from opioid overdoses following deregulation of the prescription of buprenorphine in France and advocating for deregulation in the United States); Kevin Fiscella, Sarah E. Wakeman & Leo Beletsky, Implementing Opioid Agonist Treatment in Correctional Facilities, 178 [J]AMA INTERNAL MED.
1153, 1153-54 (2018) (describing positive outcomes following introduction of opioid treatments in correctional facilities).
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available in the United States are gathering momentum,12 but progress has been
dismally slow.13
Compared with the current roster of interventions in the United States,
these neglected tools reflect a more complete appreciation for the root causes of
the crisis. At its core, the overdose crisis is symptomatic of a crisis of
undertreated pain—physical, emotional, and economic. The structural drivers
of this crisis include factors outside of the healthcare system like financial stress,
isolation, and occupational injury,14 as well as factors within the healthcare
system like fragmented insurance coverage and healthcare financing that
privileges surgical countermeasures and skimps on preventative and “incremental” care.15 The very same structural factors have also complicated the response
to overdose and other opioid-related harms.16

12

For example, United States v. Safehouse held that, because Congress was not aware of
the existence of SCFs when it drafted the relevant section of the CSA, “no credible argument can
be made that facilities such as safe injection sites were within the contemplation of Congress.”
No. 19-0519, 2019 WL 4858266, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2019). The Safehouse judge
also acknowledged that, “[v]iewed objectively, what Safehouse proposes is far closer to
the harm reduction strategies expressly endorsed by Congress than the dangerous conduct §
856(a) seeks to prohibit.” Id. at *76. There have been some ambitious bills introduced
like the Mainstreaming Addiction Treatment Act, which would remove restrictions on
healthcare providers to prescribe buprenorphine. Mainstreaming Addition Treatment
Act, H.R. 2482, 116th Cong. (2019). Although positive, these developments are unlikely
to produce immediate relief for those most in need because of the slow pace of litigation
and legislation. In addition, two Democratic presidential candidates explicitly support
implementation of Supervised Consumption Sites. See Bernie Sanders, Justice and Safety for All,
BERNIE, https://berniesanders.com/justice-and-safety-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/KYM5DD52] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019); Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking Public Safety to Reduce Mass Incarceration and Strengthen Communities, MEDIUM (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/rethinking-public-safety-to-reduce-mass-incarceration-and-strengthen-communities-90e8591c6255 [https://perma.cc/G44P-KDBM].
13
See, e.g., Leo Beletsky et al., The Law (and Politics) of Safe Injection Facilities in the
United States, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 231, 232-37 (2008) (making the legal case for
safe consumption facilities over a decade ago).
14
See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, SPRING 2017, at 397, 438 (noting that the rise
of “deaths of despair” is a social phenomenon associated with decreased levels of individual and
collective participation in thick social networks including activities like church and unions).
15
See, e.g., T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER,
AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 6-8 (Penguin Books Ltd. ed., Reprint ed. 2009) (describing the
author’s experience seeking care for a shoulder injury in multiple countries with American
physicians suggesting a much more invasive and heroic surgical approach and with physicians
from other countries suggesting less invasive action); Atul Gawande, The Heroism of
Incremental Care, NEW YORKER, Jan. 15, 2017, at 36, 45 (noting devotion to intensive,
heroic procedures, while diminishing incremental care that often provides more benefits, and
suggesting a shift in focus from rescue medicine to more gradual and deliberate care).
16
See infra Part III.
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This Article focuses on the nexus between pain treatment, addiction,
and overdose. It argues that much more proactive measures to better control
pain among people at high overdose risk are an important but overlooked
strategy for reducing opioid-related morbidity and mortality. The social and
political terrain for this argument is tricky. Pain management is commonly
identified as a key cause of the current crisis, and opioids have been deployed
without evidence establishing their safety and efficacy in many instances.17
Pain is also a complex, ambiguous, and poorly-understood phenomenon,18
making it hard to quantify and easy to dismiss. But the crisis of pain that
spurred the proliferation of opioid analgesics is undeniable.19 As it progressed,
many of those who were managing pain through opioid pharmacotherapy moved
on to street drugs because of supply-side policy measures, reformulations, cost,
availability, and other factors.20 Their pain—physical or otherwise—has
17

An increasing reliance on opioids to treat pain has been associated with a rising opioid
crisis in the United States. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., PAIN
MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL
BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 1-2 (Nat’l Acads. Press ed. 2017)
(ebook) (asserting that the “increase in opioid-related deaths has occurred in tandem
with an equally unprecedented increase in prescribing of opioid medications for purposes
of pain management”). A three-paper series in Lancet documents the role of inappropriate
opioid prescribing after surgery as a major cause of the opioid epidemic. See Lesley A. Colvin
et al., Perioperative Opioid Analgesia—When Is Enough Too Much? A Review of Opioid-induced
Tolerance and Hyperalgesia, 393 LANCET 1558, 1568 (2019) (discussing “tolerance and opioidinduced hyperalgesia”); Paul Glare et al., Transition from Acute to Chronic Pain After Surgery, 393 LANCET 1537, 1537 (2019) (documenting the “epidemiology and societal effect,
basic science, and current recommendations for managing persistent postsurgical pain”);
Mark D. Neuman et al., Inappropriate Opioid Prescription After Surgery, 393 LANCET
1547, 1547 (2019) (tracing “the evolution of prescription opioid use for pain treatment
after surgery in the USA, Canada, and other countries” and its impact on opioid overprescribing and misuse).
18
See, e.g., Karina M. Berg et al., Providers’ Experiences Treating Chronic Pain Among
Opioid-Dependent Drug Users, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 482, 483 (2009) (noting in a
study of the experiences of physicians that “[a] central focus for many providers was the
inherent ambiguity of pain treatment. Providers felt more comfortable treating chronic pain
that was supported by concrete evidence”).
19
See, e.g., David G. Blanchflower & Andrew Oswald, Unhappiness and Pain in Modern
America: A Review Essay, and Further Evidence, on Carol Graham's Happiness for All? 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24087, 2017) (confirming that
“Americans appear to be in greater pain than citizens of other countries, and most sub-groups
of citizens have downwardly trended happiness levels.”); CAROL GRAHAM, HAPPINESS FOR
ALL? UNEQUAL HOPES AND LIVES IN PURSUIT OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 80 (Princeton Univ.
Press ed. 2017) (noting an epidemic of pain among all but the most affluent Americans).
20
As a 2013 study suggests,
The widespread availability of opioid analgesics outside sanctioned channels and,
paradoxically, medical and regulatory attempts to curb this through monitoring and
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remained and, in many cases, worsened.21 It is now well-recognized that,
collateral to the overdose crisis response, the pendulum has swung too far
away from access to pain pharmacotherapy.22
The overlap of pain and high-risk opioid use is especially pronounced
among people who inject drugs without stable housing.23 People who use
drugs have never received adequate health care, including pain care—a
situation aggravated by the current efforts to constrain access to opioid pain
pharmacotherapy. Individuals in this highly-marginalized group are forced to
inject in settings that put them at high risk for otherwise avoidable infections,
which can produce a cascade of excruciating conditions.24 Self-medication
limiting prescribing, appear to be drawing a new generation into higher risk heroin
injecting . . . [users are] ultimately persuaded by market forces when their pill of
choice becomes unavailable or unaffordable.
Sarah G. Mars et al., “Every ‘Never’ I Ever Said Came True”: Transitions from Opioid Pills
to Heroin Injecting, 25 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 257, 264 (2013).
21
See Jianren Mao, Opioid-Induced Abnormal Pain Sensitivity, 10 CURRENT PAIN &
HEADACHE REP. 67, 68 (2006) (finding that, as opioid therapy progresses for an individual,
the continued use of opioids as treatment activates a pronociceptive mechanism that increases
pain sensitivity).
22
See George Comerci Jr. et al., Controlling the Swing of the Opioid Pendulum, 378 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 691, 691-93 (2018) (describing how hard line blanket refusals to prescribe
opioids can increase patient suffering); Meredith Lawrence, How the CDC Guidelines Killed
My Husband, 8 NARRATIVE INQUIRY IN BIOETHICS 219, 219 (2018) (describing the author’s
husband’s decision to commit suicide after his pain care was drastically reduced after the
guidelines were announced); Joseph V. Pergolizzi Jr. et al., Three Years Down the Road: The
Aftermath of the CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, 36 ADVANCES
IN THERAPY 1235, 1235-38 (2019) (suggesting that efforts to reduce overdose have stimulated
a silent epidemic of unmanaged chronic pain); Stefan G. Kertesz & Kate M. Nicholson, No
More ‘Shortcuts’ in Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain. Millions of Americans Need
Nuanced Care, STAT NEWS, (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/04/26/noshortcuts-prescribing-opioids-chronic-pain/ [https://perma.cc/YX62-M58L] (“The health
care system’s failure to allow for nuance has put at risk the more than 10 million Americans
who take opioids to manage pain.”).
23
Cf. Pauline Voon et al., Self-Management of Pain Among People Who Inject Drugs in
Vancouver, PAIN MGMT. 27, 31 (Mar. 2014) (finding that “a large majority (97.5%) of the
recruited active [study participants who inject drugs] who reported moderate-to-extreme
pain had self-managed their pain within their lifetime” and that homelessness was positively
associated with self-managed pain).
24
See, e.g., Carl Latkin et al., My Place, Your Place, and No Place: Behavior Settings as a
Risk Factor for HIV-Related Injection Practices of Drug Users in Baltimore, Maryland, 22
AM. J. CMTY. PSYCHOL. 415, 426-27 (1994) (finding that reports of injecting at shooting
galleries and semi-public areas were significantly associated with risky injection practices
partly explained by the lack of availability of sanitation resources); Will Small et al., Public
Injection Settings in Vancouver: Physical Environment, Social Context and Risk, 18 INT’L J.
DRUG POL’Y 27, 28 (2007) (noting that those who inject in public display increased risk for
adverse health outcomes like abscesses, injection related vein damage, HCV infection, and
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for these harms and barriers to care are also mediated by emotional pain and
other vulnerabilities like mental illness or serious physical disability.25 Injection
in public settings is associated with an especially high risk of violence and
other injuries.26 Many of these individuals would benefit from medication
therapy, but a number of barriers prevent them from doing so.27 For some, the
primary barrier is a chaotic daily existence, which does not align with regimented
and often overbearing requirements of treatment; inadequate insurance and
other logistical barriers limit access, too.28 Pervasive stigma, criminalization,
and racism undermine patient care and facilitate patient abandonment.29
overdose); David Vlahov et al., Reductions in High-Risk Drug Use Behaviors Among
Participants in the Baltimore Needle Exchange Program, 16 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES & HUMAN RETROVIROLOGY 400, 401 (1997) (noting the importance of considering physical settings of where injections occur, as injections performed
in public are less likely to be hygienic than those performed in residences).
25
See infra Section II.B and note 57.61.
26
See, e.g., Paula Braitstein et al., Sexual Violence among a Cohort of Injection Drug Users,
57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 561, 566 (2003) (finding a high prevalence of lifetime sexual violence
among the studied cohort of injection drug users); Mary Clare Kennedy et al., Residential Eviction and Exposure to Violence among People Who Inject Drugs in Vancouver, Canada, 41
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 59, 59 (2017) (noting that people who inject drugs experience significantly elevated rates of both physical and sexual violence); Lindsey A. Richardson et al., Socioeconomic Marginalisation in the Structural Production of Vulnerability to Violence Among
People Who Use Illicit Drugs, 69 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 686, 687-91
(2015) (noting that violence is common among people who use drugs, and that lack of secure
income-generating opportunities produces much of the risk for experiencing violence).
27
Some impediments are logistical, administrative, or legal. See, e.g., Gary Enos, Advocate:
Philadelphia Smoking Ban Shuts Some Patients out of Treatment, 31 ALCOHOLISM & DRUG
ABUSE WKLY., no. 23, 2019, at 1, 5 (noting one social worker’s position that the same city
smoking ban induces patients to leave treatment or results in their administrative discharge);
Brooke Feldman, Why Philly’s Smoking Ban at Addiction Treatment Centers Will Be
Harmful, FILTER (Feb. 12, 2019), https://filtermag.org/philadelphia-smoking-ban-addiction-treatment-harm-reduction/ (describing a city ban on smoking outside residential substance
abuse treatment centers as a further barrier people who use drugs must consider when
deciding to enter treatment); Paul M. Roman et al., Using Medication-Assisted Treatment
for Substance Use Disorders: Evidence of Barriers and Facilitators of Implementation, 36
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 584, 587 (2011) (describing multiple barriers to successful adoption
of substance use disorder medications, such as rigid treatment ideology and lack of access
to prescribing physicians).
28
Unmanaged pain can be extremely destabilizing. See infra Part II.B.
29
See, e.g., DL Biancarelli et al., Strategies Used by People Who Inject Drugs to Avoid
Stigma in Healthcare Settings, 198 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 80, 81-83 (2019)
(presenting the stigmatizing experiences of people who inject drugs and how those experiences
influence poor health care decisions to avoid anticipated stigma); C.E. Paquette, Stigma at
Every Turn: Health Services Experiences Among People Who Inject Drugs, 57 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 104, 106-08 (2018) (describing the pervasiveness of stigma people who inject drugs
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Increasing concerns about relinquishing control over opioid analgesic supplies,
along with institutional and law enforcement pressure to improve medication
stewardship have contributed to reluctance to provide adequate pain treatment.
As a result, some people experience numerous touchpoints with healthcare
and criminal justice systems, but opportunities for supportive services go
unrealized.30 When care is provided, it happens far downstream in expensive and
inherently untherapeutic acute care settings or jails, despite the broadly acknowledged benefits of supporting such “frequent flyers” with resources upstream.31
Experience in other countries suggests that one important tool for
reducing drug-related harms among such marginalized individuals is access
to a stable and safe supply of opioids.32 But in view of wide-spread concerns
about over-utilization and diversion of opioid analgesics, we propose providing
this health service within a well-recognized healthcare model: DirectlyObserved Therapy (DOT). A framework for Directly-Observed Therapy for
face and how stigmatization surrounding participants’ access to resources like syringes and
methadone treatment discourages them from seeking to purchase syringes and accessing
treatment in the future).
30
See Marc R. Larochelle et al., Touchpoints—Opportunities to Predict and Prevent Opioid
Overdose: A Cohort Study, 204 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 4 (2019) (noting that, in
a Massachusetts study, effective interventions at critical healthcare and criminal justice
system touchpoints could have eliminated up to 50% of opioid overdose deaths, but that the
systems lacked effective interventions to recognize areas for improvement).
31
See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 10, at 1096-98 (discussing the use of supervised injection
facilities as a legally feasible and less socially costly alternative to current prevailing
regimes for addressing illegal drug use in the United States, where studies suggest many
people who use illegal drugs are subject to criminal prosecution and sent to jail rather than
treatment, confounding therapeutic intent); Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel
Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 185 (2018) (concluding that “[w]e have lost the commonsense imperative to engage those who use opioids in comprehensive care, especially during periods when
access to opioids may be fluctuating”); Uchenna Emeche, Is a Strategy Focused on SuperUtilizers Equal to the Task of Health Care System Transformation? Yes, 13 ANNALS FAM.
MED. 6, 6 (2015) (finding that so-called “super-utilizers” of health care, not limited to people
who inject drugs, represent 50% of health care expenditures, which can be reduced by
intervening before emergency visits are required); Brendan Saloner et al., A Public Health
Strategy for the Opioid Crisis, 133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 24S, 31S (2018) (finding that investing in
programs which help people to safely use drugs, among other things, will better ensure patient
survival and public safety than abstinence-only drug policies); Grant G. Simpson et al., A
Patient-Centered Emergency Department Management Strategy for Sickle-Cell Disease Super-Utilizers, 18 WESTERN J. EMERGENCY MED. 335, 335 (2017) (suggesting that coordinated
care plans are feasible and potentially effective in reducing emergency department visits among
super-utilizers with sickle-cell disease); Bara Vaida, For Super-Utilizers, Integrated Care
Offers A New Path, 36 HEALTH AFF. 394 (2017) (describing several nascent models for
reducing super-utilizers’ cost burden by connecting them with resources and intervening to
ensure care before it is emergent).
32
See infra Section II.D.
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Pain (DOT-P) would resemble a specialty intensive pain care clinic, where
healthcare professionals would provide pharmaceutical-grade opioids like
hydromorphone in a monitored setting, along with key wraparound services.
DOT-P would address concerns with polypharmacy33 and overdose,34 while
also operationalizing a “closed system.” Operating similarly to iOAT clinics
that exist in other international settings, a DOT-P model would be reserved
for highly vulnerable people who inject drugs, have diagnosable acute or serious
chronic pain, and have not benefited from other pharmacotherapy. This approach
would provide essential care to a marginalized population while minimizing
risk of diversion—a principal concern in the context of the current crisis.35

33

See, e.g., Aubrey Whelan, Pennsylvania’s Overdose Crisis Is Shifting, New DEA Report
Finds, PHILA. INQUIRER (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/health/dea-philadelphia-statewide-overdose-numbers-shifting-20191002.html [https://perma.cc/37FH-R5DT]
(“Most—87%—overdose victims had two or more drugs in their system, 46% had four or
more drugs, and 16% had six or more drugs.”).
34
See infra notes 91–92.
35
Although diversion does not fully explain the opioid crisis, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text, it is an important and concerning phenomenon. Diversion takes many forms. Sometimes
unused opioids, which are prescribed for one individual’s post-surgical analgesia, end up
being used nonmedically by another individual. See, e.g., Sean Esteban McCabe, Christian
J. Teter, & Carol J. Boyd, Illicit Use of Prescription Pain Medication Among College
Students, 77 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 37, 41 (2005) (describing diversion and illicit
use of prescription pain medication among undergraduate students at a large Midwestern
university). In many other instances, opioids were diverted into illicit channels by unscrupulous pill mills or at other points in the supply chain. James A. Inciardi et al., The Diversion
of Prescription Opioid Analgesics, 7 LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEC. FORUM 127, 133 (2007).
There are longstanding concerns about the diversion of methadone. See, e.g., Alison Ritter
& Richard Di Natale, The Relationship Between Take-Away Methadone Policies and Methadone Diversion, 24 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 347, 348 (2005) (finding, on a high level, less
diversion in Australian states with stricter methadone take-away policies). Today, there is
even evidence of wide-scale diversion of buprenorphine, although the nature of that diversion is
complex and may say more about inadequate access to medication treatment, rather than
recreational use. See Jennifer J. Carroll, Josiah D. Rich & Traci C. Green, The More Things
Change: Buprenorphine/Naloxone Diversion Continues While Treatment Remains Inaccessible,
12 J. ADDICTION MED. 459, 459 (2018) (finding that rates of diverted buprenorphine use
among Rhode Island-based survey respondents remained similar between 2009 and 2016);
Theodore J. Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis & Howard D. Chilcoat, Understanding the Use of
Diverted Buprenorphine, 193 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 117, 117 (2018) (finding that
58% of surveyed adults meeting DSM-IV criteria for substance use disorder and primary opioid
use reported a history of using diverted buprenorphine, which partly reflects inadequate access
to buprenorphine through health care channels); Chris-Ellyn Johanson et al., Diversion and
Abuse of Buprenorphine: Findings from National Surveys of Treatment Patients and
Physicians, 120 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 190, 190 (2012) (finding increasing
diversion to be a threat to the continued of approval of buprenorphine for treatment of OUD).
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Though distinguishable from maintenance, iOAT, and SCFs,36 DOT-P shares
some of their strengths including overdose prevention, providing linkages to services, reducing drug use in public settings, and reducing community disorder.37
Unfortunately, DOT-P is not currently implemented in the United
States in a robust or systematic way. We argue that to reduce overdose risks
and other health harms from drug injection, far more must to be done to address
the patients’ underlying pain. This Article begins in Part II by explaining the
co-occurrence of pain, opioid use disorder (OUD), and housing instability
through a vignette and through a review of relevant epidemiological research.
We then describe the benefits of DOT-P for this population in terms of
underlying theory and related evaluation research. In Part III, we provide a
reasonable legal roadmap for operationalizing such an approach. We conclude
in Part IV with some normative observations and predictions.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PAIN-CENTERED CARE
A. John’s Life of Self-Medicated Pain
John is 42 years old and has lived in Kensington, a Philadelphia
neighborhood, for his entire life. For the past eight years, he has injected
heroin. Sometimes John lives with his sister and at other times he bounces
between shelters and street homelessness. John’s day-to-day life is physically
challenging. For years he has lived with depression, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disorder (COPD), and persistent lower back and extremity pain.
John is practiced at finding a vein and minimizing risk of infection
while injecting. He always uses sterile syringes obtained from the local syringe
exchange. But still he has had a number of infections in recent years, which
he attributes to a handful of instances when impending withdrawal forced
him to inject quickly in a poorly lit area with heroin not purchased from his
usual dealer. When an abscess appeared on his leg recently, he delayed treatment
because of past negative experiences in the local hospital. However, a vicious
fever and disabling thigh pain forced him into the emergency department
where he learned that the infection had infiltrated his blood and colonized in
his femur. After a two-day inpatient stay in the local hospital, John left against
medical advice because he felt that the people caring for him viewed him
suspiciously and (perhaps relatedly) because his pain was undertreated.
36

See infra note 234 and accompanying text describing the statutory and regulatory definitions
of maintenance and detoxification. There is no single definition of “Supervised Consumption
Facility,” but the model proposed so far in the United States would require people who use
drugs to bring illicit substances into the facility for self-administration. See United States v.
Safehouse, No. 19-0519, 2019 WL 4858266, at *2, *27 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2019).
37
See infra notes 59–61.

74

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[November 2019

The physical challenges in John’s life add to considerable social
challenges. John has some wonderful personality traits. He considers himself
an elder statesperson among some of the people who inject drugs in the
neighborhood. He is quick to share a cigarette or knowledge about how to
inject more safely. He is often witty and self-aware. But his life is frequently
hectic and always stressful. Finding ways to pay for heroin consumes his
thoughts and energy, and to stave off impending withdrawal he sometimes
steals, which adds to the sense of shame he experiences when living on the
street or getting care at the emergency department for injection-related harms.
He has a deep love for his sister and once had diverse interests and hopes.
And he often wishes and sometimes plans to find and stick with treatment.
But the daily hustle has sapped his strength, and the idea of confronting the
terrible things he has experienced without the euphoric escape of heroin is
daunting. Pain is persistent and overwhelming for most of his waking day.
John is not typical of all people who inject drugs.38 But John’s medical and
social complexities are common among the small portion of people who inject
drugs in public spaces. These people often have overlapping and synergizing
vulnerabilities including unstable housing, mental illness, physical disability, and
a history of trauma. They have the greatest unmet healthcare needs and would
benefit the most from coordinated medical homes. But developing and sustaining
trusting relationships with marginalized people is not a strength of institutional
medicine. Stigma explains part of why people like John report negative healthcare
experiences. So too does fear: John requires clinical management for considerable
pain, but he looks like the type of patient for whom too much prescribing might
elicit a call from the authorities. In the next section, we describe how often pain
and OUD co-occur among people with unstable housing.
B. Co-Occurrence of OUD, Serious Pain, and Housing Instability
Pain is the single greatest source of disability in developed countries.39 An
estimated 50 million American adults (more than 20% of the United States
38

John’s story is based on an agglomeration of real individuals’ experiences and meant to
illuminate the conditions that this group endures.
39
Musculoskeletal conditions are the leading contributor to disability worldwide, with low
back pain being the single leading cause of disability globally. James Dahlhamer et al.,
Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain Among Adults—United States,
2016, 67 MORBIDITY& MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1001-06 (2018); Jan Hartvigsen et al., What
Low Back Pain Is and Why We Need to Pay Attention, 391 LANCET 2356-67 (2018); Andrew
S. C. Rice et al., Pain and the Global Burden of Disease, 157 PAIN 791, 792 (2015) (describing how chronic low back pain, neck pain, migraine, and other musculoskeletal disorders
consistently featured in the top ten reasons for years lived with disability worldwide,
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population) suffer from chronic pain, meaning it affects more people in the
United States than diabetes and cancer.40 Chronic and acute pain41 are especially
common among people with OUD. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses suggest
that somewhere between 48% and 64% of people who use opioids nonmedically
have chronic pain,42 with individual studies reporting prevalence as high as 81%.43
The relationship between OUD, pain, and housing instability is
multidirectional. Over 60% of OUD patients experienced chronic pain before
the onset of their OUD.44 In many instances, people were over- or unnecessarilyand indicating that seven of the commonest chronic conditions globally were primary
pain conditions); Musculoskeletal Conditions, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/musculoskeletal-conditions [https://perma.cc
/VN9Y-BGKX].
40
James Dahlhamer et al., Prevalence of Chronic Pain and High-Impact Chronic Pain
Among Adults—United States, 2016, 67 MORBIDITY& MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1002, 1003
(2018). According to the most recent surveillance estimates of the population living in the
United States, there are just over 30 million people with diabetes and less than 16 million
people living with cancer. DIV. OF DIABETES TRANSLATION, CTR. DISEASES CONTROL &
PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS REPORT, 2017, at 2 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf
[https://perma. cc/8CUJ-P593]; Cancer Stat Facts: Cancer of Any Site, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://seer. cancer.gov/statfacts/html/all.html [https://perma.cc/D84L-BVPP] (last visited
Nov. 13, 2019).
41
Acute pain is a useful and temporary activation of the sympathetic nervous system in
response to a specific disease or injury. See Katherine P. Grichnik & Francis M. Ferrante,
The Difference Between Acute and Chronic Pain, 58 MT. SINAI J. MED. 217-20 (1991).
Chronic pain is a persistent condition serving no useful biological purpose. Id. Treatment of
acute pain aims to address the underlying cause; treatment of chronic pain requires a multidisciplinary approach targeting physiological and psychological etiologies. Id.
42
See Benedikt Fischer et al., The Prevalence of Mental Health and Pain Symptoms in General
Population Samples Reporting Nonmedical Use of Prescription Opioids: A Systematic Review
and Meta-Analysis, 13 J. PAIN 1029, 1029 (2012) (noting pain has been associated with nonmedical prescription opioid use (NMPOU) in general populations, and finding the pooled
prevalence of pain in general populations reporting NMPOU to be 48%); Yih-Ing Hser
et al., Chronic Pain Among Patients with Opioid Use Disorder: Results from Electronic
Health Records Data, 77 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 26, 29 (2017) (finding in a
review of 5307 electronic health records over the course of a decade that most OUD patients
(64.4%) had chronic pain conditions).
43
See Kevin Vowles et al., Rates Of Opioid Misuse, Abuse, and Addiction in Chronic Pain:
A Systematic Review And Data Synthesis, 156 PAIN 569, 569, 573-74 (2015) (noting rates of
opioid prescriptions have increased and are among the most frequently prescribed medications, and finding the range of rates of problematic use to be even broader than reported in
previous work with rates ranging from 0.08% to 81%).
44
See Yih-Ing Hser et al., supra note 42, at 29 (finding in a study of 5307 adult patients with
OUD in a large healthcare system that most patients with opioid use disorder developed it
after developing chronic pain); Roger G. Weiss et al., Reasons for Opioid Use Among
Patients with Dependence on Prescription Opioids: The Role of Chronic Pain, 47 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 140, 140 (2014) (reporting from a survey of 653 participants
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prescribed opioids for pain management;45 in other instances, however,
OUD resulted from undertreatment of pain by clinicians.46
OUD may also produce pain through a process called hyperalgesia.47
Chronic use of high doses of opioids increases sensitivity to painful stimuli.48
Hyperalgesia can stimulate new pain or exacerbate preexisting pain.49
Combined with tolerance, it can contribute to a dangerous cycle in which
patients with OUD need increasingly higher doses of opioids to avoid
withdrawal, which lowers tolerance to painful stimuli. Hyperalgesia can
that participants with chronic pain were significantly more likely than those without chronic
pain to cite pain management the primary reason for initiation of opioid use).
45
See Gillian Beauchamp et al., Moving Beyond Misuse and Diversion: The Urgent Need to
Consider the Role of Iatrogenic Addiction in the Current Opioid Epidemic, 104 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2023, 2023 (2014) (“Some individuals transition to nonmedical use and addiction
despite their intention to use medications only as directed and only for pain relief.”); Martin
Makary, Heidi N Overton & Peiqi Wang, Overprescribing Is Major Contributor to Opioid
Crisis, 359 BRIT. MED. J. 4792, 4792-93 (2017) (noting that a major contributor to the
opioid epidemic is physician overprescribing, evidenced by 2016 Medicare data suggesting
that about 80% of patients were prescribed more pain tablets than the best practice range
after routine laparoscopic cholecystectomy); Barry Meisenberg et al., Assessment of Opioid
Prescribing Practices Before and After Implementation of a Health System Intervention to
Reduce Opioid Overprescribing, 1 [J]AMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 2 (2018) (noting that surging
opioid overdose deaths were “preceded by a 300% expansion of retail opioid prescribing
beginning in the early 1990s and peaking in 2012,” and that prescription opioids, “including
diverted prescription opioids, were the initial source of opioids for most current heroin users”).
46
Kelly K. Dineen, Defining Misprescribing to Inform Prescription Opioid Policy, 48
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5-6 (2018) (noting that underprescribing, characterized by withholding
appropriate opioids, rapid tapering, as well as refusals to refer patients for medication-assisted treatment, can lead to unnecessary suffering, suicide, and use of illicit drugs); Howard
L. Fields, The Doctor’s Dilemma: Opiate Analgesics and Chronic Pain, 69 NEURON 591,
591-94 (2011) (addressing how much harm is done to patients with chronic pain by withholding
opiate analgesics due to inadequate pain relief); Andrew Rosenblum et al., Opioids and the
Treatment of Chronic Pain: Controversies, Current Status, and Future Directions, 16
EXPERIMENTAL & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 405, 405-16 (2008) (“Undertreatment
of pain among addicted persons may lead to the adverse medical, social and personal
consequences associated with continued drug-seeking behavior.”).
47
See Marion Lee et al., A Comprehensive Review of Opioid-Induced Hyperalgesia, 14 PAIN
PHYSICIAN 145, 145 (2011) (defining opioid-induced hyperalgesia (OIH) as a state of
nociceptive sensitization caused by exposure to opioids, and explaining that OIH is characterized
by a paradoxical response whereby a patient receiving opioids for the treatment of pain could
actually become more sensitive to certain painful stimuli).
48
See Larry Chu, Martin Angst & David Clark, Opioid-Induced Hyperalgesia in Humans:
Molecular Mechanisms and Clinical Considerations, 24 CLINICAL J. PAIN 479, 485-86
(2008) (describing case reports and studies of OIH in patients receiving high dose opioids).
49
See, e.g., Stephen P. Cohen et al., The Effect of Opioid Dose and Treatment Duration on
the Perception of a Painful Standardized Clinical Stimulus, 33 REGIONAL ANESTHESIA &
PAIN MED. 199, 199 (2008) (finding in a study of 355 patients that “[b]oth opioid dose and
duration of treatment directly correlated with pain intensity and unpleasantness scores”).
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result from chronic exposure to any opioid, including methadone,50 threatening
adherence to treatment when pain is poorly managed.51
Prevalence of pain is even higher for people with OUD who are not
stably housed.52 Unmanaged pain and OUD are often contributing factors in
transitions away from stable employment and housing, which, in turn, produce
more pain and greater challenges to managing OUD.53 Without employment
some people turn to theft or sex work, increasing risk of trauma and involvement
with the criminal justice system.54 Without adequate shelter, people experience
50

See, e.g., Mark Doverty et al., Methadone Maintenance Patients Are Cross-Tolerant to the
Antinociceptive Effects of Morphine, 93 PAIN 155, 155 (2001) (“Our findings suggest that
methadone patients are cross-tolerant to the antinociceptive effects of morphine, and
conventional doses of morphine are likely to be ineffective in managing episodes of acute
pain amongst this patient group.”).
51
See Peggy Compton, V.C. Charuvastra & Walter Ling, Pain Intolerance in Opioid-Maintained
Former Opiate Addicts: Effect of Long-Acting Maintenance Agent, 63 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 139, 142 (2001) (describing a study of 36 methadone or buprenorphine-maintained patients where the authors found that control patients “remain[ed] in the ice bath more
than twice as long as the former opioid abusers,” suggesting that methadone or buprenorphine
mediated hyperalgesia as measured by a lower tolerance to pain caused by cold sensitivity); Mark
Doverty et al., Hyperalgesic Responses in Methadone Maintenance Patients, 90 PAIN 91,
93-94 (2001) (finding that the ratio of pain tolerance to pain detection was lower for patients
receiving methadone medication in cold pressor and electrical stimulation tests, suggesting
that such patients could endure a painful stimulus for shorter periods of time than control
patients after initial detection of the stimulus).
52
See Rebecca Fisher et al., The Nature And Prevalence of Chronic Pain in Homeless
Persons: An Observational Study, 2 F1000 RES., July 30, 2013, at 1, 1, 6 (noting that the
prevalence of chronic pain in homeless participants is substantially higher than the prevalence in
several large population studies); Marc Vogel et al., Chronic Pain Among Homeless Persons
with Mental Illness, 18 AM. ACAD. PAIN MED. 2280, 2282, 2285 (2017) (noting that 43.4%
of homeless participants had clinically significant chronic pain and “more than a third reported
using street drugs to control pain”).
53
See, e.g., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MEETING THE HOUSING NEEDS OF
PEOPLE WITH SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/
atoms/files/5-1-19hous.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D4H-4CC9]; SUSAN G. PFEFFERLE,
SAMANTHA S. KARON & BRANDY WYANT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CHOICE MATTERS: HOUSING MODELS THAT MAY PROMOTE RECOVERY FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND FAMILIES FACING OPIOID USE DISORDER 4-5 (2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/choice-matters-housing-models-may-promote-recovery-individuals-and-families-facing-opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/NA3W-ABRG].
54
See generally Paula Braitstein et al., Sexual Violence Among a Cohort Of Injection Drug
Users, 57 SOC. SCI. MED. 561 (2003); Clifford A. Butzin, Steven S. Martin & James A. Inciardi,
Treatment During Transition from Prison to Community and Subsequent Illicit Drug Use,
28 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & TREATMENT 351 (2005); Mary Clare Kennedy et al., Residential
Eviction and Exposure to Violence Among People Who Inject Drugs in Vancouver, Canada,
41 INT. J. DRUG POL’Y 59, 62 (2017); Daniel J. O’Connell, Investigating Latent Trait and
Life Course Theories as Predictors of Recidivism Among an Offender Sample, 31 J. CRIM.
JUST. 455 (2003); Jerome J. Platt, Vocational Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 416 (1995).
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more violence and other injuries.55 The marginalization that comes with
homelessness makes it more likely that untreated injuries and infections
become chronic conditions, as indicated by high prevalence of serious tooth
decay, cancer, cardiovascular disease, asthma, and other persistent sources of
discomfort, disability, and death.56 Homelessness, pain, and OUD are also
linked through shared associations with third factors, chief among them being
childhood adversity.57 Traumatic early life experiences are associated with
55
Health problems are exacerbated by the conditions of homelessness, such as lack of a
comfortable sleeping place, exposure to weather, prevalence of violence, inadequate health
and hygiene practices, overcrowding at shelters, unreliable food sources, and extensive
walking. Kennedy et al., supra note 54, at 62.
56
See Lillian Gelberg & Lawrence S. Linn, Assessing the Physical Health of Homeless
Adults, 262 [J]AMA 1973, 1975-76, 1978 (1989) (finding that “[p]ersons sampled in
emergency shelters. . . had the fewest symptoms of physical illness; persons in centers were
intermediate in their physical health; and persons sampled from outdoor areas had the most
physical health problems” such as acute skin injury, abnormal gait, elevated liver enzyme
levels, mean corpuscular hemoglobin concentrations, and globulin levels, high lactate
dehydrogenase levels, and low serum urea nitrogen levels); Margot B. Kushel, Eric Vittinghoff
& Jennifer S. Haas, Factors Associated with the Health Care Utilization of Homeless Persons,
285 [J]AMA 200, 200 (2001) (noting that “research has documented that homeless persons
have high rates of physical illness, mental illness, substance abuse, and early mortality”);
Christine L. Savage et al, Health Care Needs of Homeless Adults at a Nurse-Managed Clinic,
23 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING 225, 229-31 (2006) (noting homeless adults’ emergency
department (ED) use during the six months prior to the survey was reported by 61% of
participants; of these, 40% used the ED at least once per month with the most frequently
reported medical diagnoses relating to behavioral health and the most frequently reported
physical health diagnoses including hypertension, arthritis, asthma, and chronic back pain).
57
Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have been implicated in almost every major harm.
See, e.g., Robert Anda et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease in Adults, 34 AM. J. PREV. MED. 396, 396 (2008) (finding that five or
more ACEs increased risk of COPD by 2.6 times with only partial attenuation of the relationship
when controlling for smoking, the primary risk factor for COPD); DP Chapman et al.,
Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Depressive Disorders in Adulthood, 82 J.
AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 217, 217 (2004) (finding that experiencing childhood emotional
abuse increased risk for lifetime depressive disorders over 2.5 times, with more childhood
adversity associated with more depression in a dose-response relationship); SR Dube et al.,
Childhood Abuse, Household Dysfunction and the Risk of Attempted Suicide Throughout the
Life Span: Findings from the Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, 286 [J]AMA 3089, 3089
(2001) (finding that having one or more adverse childhood experiences accounts for 67%,
64%, and 80% of the risk for lifetime, adult, and childhood/adolescent suicide attempts,
respectively.); CL Whitfield et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and Hallucinations, 29
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 797, 797 (2005) (finding that people with seven or more ACEs
had a five-fold increase in the risk of reporting hallucinations compared to someone with no
reported ACEs). It is hardly surprising, then, that OUD often co-occurs with other physical
and mental illness. See, e.g., Tea Rosic et al., The Impact of Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders
on Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Opioid Use Disorder: A Prospective Cohort Study,
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both more painful conditions58 and greater sensitivity to painful stimuli.59 When
these painful conditions exist in populations experiencing other vulnerabilities,
adequate care is less likely, increasing the risk for self-medication.60 This
complex set of factors explains why some epidemiologists have suggested
that nearly two thirds of injection drug use can be attributed to adverse
childhood experiences.61
C. Practice and Underlying Theory
Non-adherence to treatment is common across patient populations
and clinical indications, with as many as half of all patients failing to take
13 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 1399, 1399 (2017) (finding that 80% of
patients receiving methadone treatment had a co-occurring psychiatric disorder and 42% had
another co-occurring substance use disorder). Furthermore, early childhood adversity is
heavily associated with opioid use disorder and its harms and may predict relapse. See
Genevieve Chandler, Karen Kalmakis & Teri Murtha, Screening Adults with Substance Use
Disorder for Adverse Childhood Experiences, 29 J. ADDICTIONS NURSING 172, 172 (2018)
(finding that more than 80% of individuals in an OUD recovery program had six or more
ACEs); Karen J. Derefinko et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences Predict Opioid Relapse
During Treatment Among Rural Adults, 96 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 171, 171 (2019) (observing
that higher ACEs were associated with a higher probability of relapse at medication-assisted
treatment centers, but also finding that relapse rates went down as individuals continued
treatment); Michael D. Stein et al., Adverse Childhood Experience Effects on Opioid Use
Initiation, Injection Drug Use, and Overdose Among Persons with Opioid Use Disorder, 179
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 325, 325 (2017) (reporting associations between high levels
of ACEs in patients seeking detoxification and age of initiation of drug use, injection drug
use, and overdose).
58
See Natalie J. Sachs-Ericsson et al., When Emotional Pain Becomes Physical: Adverse
Childhood Experiences, Pain, and the Role of Mood and Anxiety Disorders, 73 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 1403, 1404-05 (listing the many ways that ACEs have been found to be linked to
painful medical conditions).
59
See Julia I. Herzog & Christian Schmahl, Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Consequences
on Neurobiological, Psychosocial, and Somatic Conditions Across the Lifespan, 9
FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY, Sept. 4, 2018, at 1, 4 (2018) (detailing a variety of circumstances
in which ACEs predict unusual and heightened sensitivity to pain stimuli).
60
See Pauline Voon et al., Pain As a Risk Factor for Substance Use: A Qualitative Study of
People Who Use Drugs in British Columbia, Canada, 15 HARM REDUCTION J. 35, 35 (2018)
(finding that “experiences with inadequately managed pain in various policy, economic,
physical, and social environments reinforced marginalization, such as restrictive policies,
economic vulnerability, lack of access to socio-physical support systems, stigma from health
professionals, and denial of pain medication leading to risky self-medication.”); Pauline
Voon et al., Denial of Prescription Analgesia Among People Who Inject Drugs in a Canadian
Setting, 34 DRUG AND ALCOHOL REV. 221, 225 (2015) (finding that around two thirds of
people who inject drugs have been denied prescription analgesia, leading a majority of those
denied to turn to street drugs as a high-risk means of self-managing their pain).
61
Robert F. Anda et al., Childhood Abuse, Neglect, and Household Dysfunction and the Risk of
Illicit Drug Use: The Adverse Childhood Experiences Study, 111 PEDIATRICS 564, 568 (2003).
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medications as directed.62 Non-adherence presents particularly important
challenges in opioid therapy because of the risks of overdose, hyperalgesia,
polypharmacy, and diversion.63 Directly-Observed Therapy (DOT) is recognized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as the
most effective strategy for ensuring treatment adherence.64 DOT has proven
especially important in the response to diseases like tuberculosis, in which
failing to complete a course of treatment can result in the development of
drug resistance.65 DOT is a simple model: the patient takes the medicine
under the supervision of a clinician who can also advise about associated or
other unrelated health issues. Given that supervision is inherently intrusive
and that logistical barriers to participation are potentially considerable, it is
important to provide DOT in settings that are welcoming and accessible.66
A clinic providing DOT-P would provide an appropriate opioid dose to
people with pain, co-occurring OUD, and housing instability. After the
administration of the opioid, clinic staff would provide care and linkages to
other services. Such administration of opioids has existed in one form or
another for over a hundred years, with some of the earliest incarnations in the
United States.67 Although the United States abandoned the practice in the
62

Marie T. Brown & Jennifer K. Bussell, Medication Adherence: WHO Cares?, 84 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 304, 304 (2011).
63
See supra notes 28-29.
64
TB 101 FOR HEALTHCARE WORKERS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/tb/webcourses/tb101/page3832.html [https://perma.cc/6Z92JVEF]
(last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
65
See generally Richard S. Garfein, Feasibility of Tuberculosis Treatment Monitoring by
Video Directly Observed Therapy: A Binational Pilot Study, 19 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS &
LUNG DISEASE 1057, 1062-63 (2015) (describing the successes of a low-cost variation of
DOT in Tijuana and San Diego in reducing the tuberculosis rates in each respective population);
Gebremedhin Gebrezgabiher et al., Treatment Outcome of Tuberculosis Patients Under
Directly Observed Treatment Short Course and Factors Affecting Outcome in Southern Ethiopia:
A Five-Year Retrospective Study, 11 PLOS ONE, Feb. 2016, at 1, 2, 8 (finding that DOT was
effective for treating tuberculosis in an Ethiopia hospital over the course of five years and
for meeting the WHO’s treatment goals).
66
See Thomas R. Frieden & John A. Sbarbaro, Promoting Adherence to Treatment for
Tuberculosis: The Importance of Direct Observation, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 407,
409 (2007) (“The key challenge of direct observation of treatment is to implement it well,
maximizing convenience of and respectful interaction with patients.”).
67
See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 76-82
(3d ed. 1999) (detailing the rise and abrupt decline of heroin and morphine maintenance in
the treatment of addiction); see also Alyson J. Bond & John Witton, Perspectives on the
Pharmacological Treatment of Heroin Addiction, 8 CLINICAL MED. INSIGHTS: PSYCHIATRY
1, 2 (2017) (explaining the development of methadone maintenance programs in the United
States in the 1960s); Edward Lewis, A Heroin Maintenance Program in the United States?,
223 [J]AMA 539, 539 (1973) (“[H]eroin appeared in the United States Pharmacopeia from
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1920s, a number of countries have since operated similar programs under
various names.68 In some programs, pharmaceutical grade heroin is administered,69 which might seem strange, but heroin is widely used for analgesia
in the United Kingdom.70 A program in the United States, however, would
probably follow Canada’s recent preference for hydromorphone, which is a
cheap71 and frequently prescribed opioid72 with a great safety profile when
administered under medical supervision.73
Centering on pain in the care of people with refractory OUD makes sense
because pain complicates OUD treatment in multiple ways. One is technical: it
is difficult to dose agonists or analgesics for people with heightened opioid
tolerance, which is common among people with OUD.74 Another is social and
contextual: providers are uneasy treating this population because of clinical

1910 to 1920 . . . by 1920, recognizing the problems of heroin addiction . . . the American
Medical Association resolved that use of the drug in the United States should be discontinued.”);
Nicola Metrebian et al., Patients Receiving a Prescription for Diamorphine (Heroin) in the
United Kingdom, 25 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 115, 115 (2006) (noting that the United
Kingdom started to offer heroin maintenance in the 1920’s).
68
Common names include Heroin-Assisted Treatment (HAT) and Injectable Opioid Agonist
Treatment (iOAT). BEAU KILMER ET AL., CONSIDERING HEROIN-ASSISTED TREATMENT AND
SUPERVISED DRUG CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED STATES xv, 24 (2018) (ebook).
69
Id. at vi.
70
See Michael Gossop & Francis Keaney, Research Note—Prescribing Diamorphine for
Medical Conditions: A Very British Practice, 34 J. DRUG ISSUES 441, 443-44 (2004) (noting
that heroin is prescribed and administered in the U.K. for acute pain, chronic pain, intractable
pain, and pediatric postoperative pain).
71
In the United States, the wholesale cost is about $0.07 per 2 mg dose. National Drug
Acquisition Cost as of 2019-02-27, DATA.MEDICAID.GOV, https://data.medicaid.gov/DrugPricing-and-Payment/NADAC-as-of-2019-02-27/s7c9-pfa6 [https://perma.cc/55Q4-ML4X]
(enter “hydromorphone” in search field; view “NADAC_Per_Unit” column) (last visited
Mar. 3, 2019); see also Hydromorphone, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. (July 2013), https:
//www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drug_chem_info/hydromorphone.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V7ES-VS5P] (“The street price of a 4 mg tablet of Dilaudid® ranges from $5 to $100 per
tablet depending on the region.”).
72
In 2016, Dilaudid was the 212th most prescribed medication in the United States, with more
than 2.5 million prescriptions. See The Top 300 of 2019, CLINCALC, https://clincalc.com/DrugStats/Top300Drugs.aspx [https://perma.cc/4DFA-6BU6] (last visited Dec. 22, 2018).
73
See generally E. Oviedo-Joekes et al., Safety Profile Of Injectable Hydromorphone and
Diacetylmorphine for Long-Term Severe Opioid Use Disorder, 176 DRUG ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 55 (2017) (finding that the safety profile of injectable hydromorphone involved
fewer adverse and serious adverse events than for diacetylmorphine, although both were
recommended for treating OUD in a supervised injection model).
74
See generally Amy Wachholtz, Simmie Foster & Martin Cheatle, Psychophysiology of
Pain and Opioid Use: Implications for Managing Pain in Patients with an Opioid Use
Disorder, 146 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1 (2015) (describing hyperalgesia in people
with OUD and addressing the difficulties inherent in treating their pain by attempting to
explain the psychophysiology of pain for those with OUD).
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ambiguity and the potential to cause harm or experience regulatory sanctions.75
This uneasiness produces poor treatment and amplifies providers’ mistrust of
patients.76 The most important, however, is practical: an enormous body of
research confirms that patients must be ready to engage in treatment for OUD
or to make other change in health behavior to have a reasonable chance of
long-term benefits, but people in serious pain are not ready to do anything
until that pain is treated.77
Few individualized interventions produce durable changes in decisionmaking absent a readiness to change.78 This is at the same time a heretical and
an obvious statement. It is heretical because we want to believe that counseling
alone can change behavior. But even simple changes—like exercising more or
eating better—are not hard because we lack information about their value
or encouragement, or even the means (especially for those reading seventy-page
articles like this); they are hard because we are unprepared to make them.79

75

See, e.g., Fiona Webster et al., An Ethnography of Chronic Pain Management in Primary
Care: The Social Organization of Physicians’ Work in the Midst of the Opioid Crisis, 14
PLOS ONE, May 2019, at 1, 1 (reporting that while treating patients with chronic pain, “many
providers describe being most challenged by the work involved in helping patients who also
struggled with poverty, mental health, and addiction,” especially because of “concerns that
they could lose their license for inappropriate prescribing, thus shifting their work from
providing treatment and care to policing their patients for malingering and opioid abuse”).
76
See Berg et al., supra note 18, at 484-86 (noting that providers treating people with OUD
and pain follow one of two very different treatment frameworks with one focused on treating
the pain and the other focused on treating the OUD, with those in the latter systematically
undertreating the pain).
77
See, e.g., Bobbi Jo H. Yarborough et al., Methadone, Buprenorphine and Preferences for
Opioid Agonist Treatment: A Qualitative Analysis, 160 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
112, 116 (2016) (noting pain as a barrier to entering MAT and noting that some participants were
more willing to accept maintenance if they believed their pain would be managed adequately).
78
See generally Gerdien H. de Weert-van Oene et al., Motivation for Treatment and Motivation
for Change in Substance-Dependent Patients with Co-Occuring Psychiatric Disorders, 47 J.
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 393 (2015) (noting that “[m]otivation for change has been related to
treatment seeking, treatment attendance, treatment retention, and treatment participation”
and concluding that lower readiness for both change and treatment predicts, to an extent, a
stronger likelihood of premature attrition from treatment); Vincent Wagner et al., Initiation
of Addiction Treatment and Access to Services: Young Adults’ Accounts of Their Help-Seeking Experiences, 27 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 1614 (2017) (describing different experiences of the decision to seek treatment).
79
See, e.g., James O. Prochaska et al., The Transtheoretical Model and Stages of Change, in
HEALTH BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 125, 127-28 (Karen Glanz et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2015) (describing the length of time people spend in the precontemplation and
contemplation stages before entering the preparation stage of the Transtheoretical Model’s
(TTM’s) Stages of Change framework, positing that it isn’t necessarily the difficulty of the
task, but rather the individual’s internal motivation to match their needs).
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Health behavior researchers have various ways of describing this concept.
One of the most common is the Stages of Change model, which posits that
changing behavior requires people to transition from precontemplation to
contemplation to preparation before sustainable action takes hold.80 Progression
through these stages is often nonlinear and frequently iterative.81 People with
OUD remain in the precontemplation phase for many reasons.82 Contemplation requires thoughtful reflection, and moving from contemplation to preparation requires self-efficacy.83 Both are difficult if not impossible for someone
80
See, e.g., Carlo C. DiClemente et al., Readiness and Stages of Change in Addiction
Treatment, 13 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 103, 114 (2004) (“A stage of change represents the
current state of the individual with respect to changing a single behavior or constellation of
behaviors.”); John C. Norcross et al., Stages of Change, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 143, 14348 (2011) (defining the stages of change and reviewing meta-analyses of studies exploring
the ability of stages of change measures to predict treatment outcomes).
81
See, e.g., John R. Gallagher et al., A Perspective from the Field: Five Interventions to
Combat the Opioid Epidemic and Ending the Dichotomy of Harm-Reduction Versus Abstinence-Based Programs, 37 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 404, 410-12 (2019) (describing a
program in which the goal was not abstinence but motivation for change, which resulted in
increased retention in treatment, referrals to detoxification and inpatient treatment programs,
and, most importantly, promoted recovery and wellbeing); David H. Morris et al., Substance
Use Consequences, Mental Health Problems, and Readiness to Change Among Veterans
Seeking Substance Use Treatment, 94 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 113, 114 (2018)
(noting in the context of research on alcohol and drug dependence that Readiness to Change
(RTC) is conceptualized as a combination of one’s perceived importance to make a change
and confidence in ability to achieve it (self-efficacy), with greater self-efficacy associated
with increased treatment engagement, more attempts to quit, better treatment retention,
sustained abstinence, and reduction of substance use among individuals with problematic
drug and alcohol use); Muhammad Washdev & Iqbal Afridi, A Survey to Determine
Motivating Factors to Quit Opioids in Treatment Seekers at a Tertiary Care Hospital, 67 J.
PAK. MED. ASS’N 1050, 1050-53 (2017) (proposing that motivation should be a main focus
in addition to pharmacological treatment for those with OUD and suggesting that low motivation
is the key predictor of poor treatment outcomes).
82
See, e.g., Emine M. Akdağ et al., The Relationship between Internalized Stigma and
Treatment Motivation, Perceived Social Support, Depression and Anxiety Levels in Opioid
Use Disorder, 28 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 394, 400 (2018) (noting
that many people with OUD struggled to advance through the early Stages of Change because of internalized stigma); Ramin Mojtabai et al., Comparing Barriers to Mental Health
Treatment and Substance Use Disorder Treatment Among Individuals with Comorbid Major
Depression and Substance Use Disorders, 46 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 268, 270
(2014) (noting cost as a barrier to treatment); Li-Tzy Wu et al., Treatment Use and Barriers
Among Adolescents with Prescription Opioid Use Disorders, 36 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 1233, 1233
(2011) (“Only 4.2% of adolescents with opioid dependence, 0.5% of those with abuse, and 0.6%
of subthreshold users reported a perceived need for treatment of nonmedical opioid use.”).
83
See, e.g., Theodore J. Cicero & Matthew S. Ellis, The Prescription Opioid Epidemic: A
Review of Qualitative Studies on the Progression from Initial Use to Abuse, 19 DIALOGUES
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 259, 264 (2017) (“The most cited reasons [for continued opioid
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experiencing pain.84 To the extent that contemplation is contingent on reasonable
comfort, addressing pain is a key step in supporting people who are stuck in
the earlier stages of change. This accounts for why people with moderate
to severe pain are less likely to access drug-related health services.85 It also
explains how some heavy-handed or insensitive strategies can undermine
readiness to change by increasing stress and decreasing self-efficacy.86
DOT-P would be community-based for three reasons. First, it would
be deployed in the community at a clinic rather than in a hospital. Hospitals
are not designed to provide an environment that is welcoming to DOT-P
use] included use as a response to life stressors . . . or as a means of self-medicating psychological issues, effects of trauma, or emotional pain.”); de Weert-van Oene et al., supra note
78, at 394 (finding in a study evaluating the association between readiness for change and
treatment adherence that readiness was more important than sociodemographics, drug use,
and other background variables in the prediction of retention in treatment.); Rebekka S. Palmer
et al., Substance User Treatment Drop-Out from Client and Clinician Perspectives: A Pilot
Study, 44 J. SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1021, 1029 (2009) (finding that the most commonly
reported reasons for dropping out of treatment were individual or personal factors rather than
program-related factors).
84
See Mojtabai et al., supra note 82, at 270 (2014) (finding in a study of 393 adults with
twelve-month major depressive episodes and substance use disorders that 38.9% of subjects
reported no interest in stopping drug use).
85
As Garland et al. observe:
Chronic pain, which affects 55%–61% of people receiving MMT, contributes
to continued opioid use, relapse, and MMT dropout. Further, traditional MAT
does not directly address the emotion regulation and reward processing deficits
characteristic of OUD—critical mechanisms of addiction and chronic pain.
Through opponent processes in the brain, emotion dysregulation and reward
deficits may amplify stress sensitization and opioid craving, serving as critical
risk factors for OUD that may be neglected by traditional MAT.
Eric L. Garland et al., Mindfulness-Oriented Recovery Enhancement Reduces Opioid
Craving Among Individuals with Opioid Use Disorder and Chronic Pain in Medication
Assisted Treatment: Ecological Momentary Assessments from a Stage 1 Randomized
Controlled Trial, 203 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 61, 61 (2019); see Taeho G. Rhee
& Robert A. Rosenheck, Use of Drug Treatment Services Among Adults With Opioid
Use Disorder: Rates, Patterns, and Correlates, PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. IN ADVANCE 1, 56 (2019) (finding that that moderate to extreme self-reported pain was associated with a
lower likelihood of using drug-related health services in adjusted multivariable analyses).
86
See Rachel Ayres et al., Enhancing Motivation Within a Rapid Opioid Substitution
Treatment Feasibility RCT: A Nested Qualitative Study, 9 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT,
PREVENTION, & POL’Y 1, 5-7 (2014) (noting that internalized motivation is more effective on
long-term change than external motivation and that pressure to be in treatment from
family, law enforcement, and healthcare professionals can provoke resistance or undermine self-efficacy); DiClemente et al., supra note 80, at 112 (“Methadone maintenance
programs often require abstinence from all ‘unauthorized’ drugs. However, individuals
who apply to and participate in these programs often are ready to change only one or two of the
drug abuse behaviors that they are engaging in and not all unauthorized drugs.”).
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patients. Many of these patients have significant and well-founded mistrust
of healthcare providers and go to great lengths to avoid emergency departments
even in the face of extremely dangerous and painful conditions.87 Second,
DOT-P would provide the intense social support—that is, the community—
required for managing pain and OUD.88 Finally, given that patients are
otherwise likely to be injecting in public settings, a DOT-P approach also
would be community care in that it reduces harms that communities experience
related to OUD including public intoxication, injection-related litter, and
illicit drug dealing.89
It is important that DOT-P incorporate a patient-centered model, which
accounts for each patient’s unique experiences, challenges, and aspirations.
Such holistic care is essential for reaching a population with a history of
trauma and other overlapping vulnerabilities. Implementation of DOT-P
would need to occur in an accessible, welcoming, and well-resourced setting.
The services provided must be oriented to the unique needs of the person,
which, given the target population, are often extensive and interrelated. In
addition to being a high threshold intervention, DOT-P is also a high intensity
and—necessarily and appropriately—low-scale intervention. Most people
with OUD do not want or would not benefit from DOT-P.90
87

See Robert Harris et al., Experiences with Skin and Soft Tissue Infections Among People Who
Inject Drugs in Philadelphia: A Qualitative Study, 187 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
8, 11, 12 (2018) (describing how many people who inject drugs in Philadelphia delayed
seeking medical care for skin and soft tissue infections, or engaged in self-care, to avoid
repeating negative healthcare experiences).
88
See Jazmin Warren et al., Role of Social Support and Self-Efficacy in Treatment Outcomes
Among Clients with Co-occurring Disorders, 89 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 267, 272
(2007) (describing how higher levels of social support among clients in treatment were predictive
of better psychological health and less use of heroin and cocaine at follow-up); cf. Markus
Heilig et al., Time to Connect: Bringing Social Context into Addiction Neuroscience, 17
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 592, 592 (2016) (describing how the use of drugs impairs
social connections, which in turn leads to more drug use).
89
See Alison Sutter et al., Public Drug Use in Eight U.S. Cities: Health Risks and Other
Factors Associated with Place of Drug Use, 64 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 62, 63-64 (2019) (finding
that nearly half of individuals using syringe exchange programs reported that one of their top two
most frequent places of drug use is a public place, and describing the harms related to public drug
use, such as increased risk of overdose and improper disposal of used needles).
90
See, e.g., Thomas V. Perneger et al., Randomised Trial of Heroin Maintenance Programme
for Addicts Who Fail in Conventional Drug Treatments, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 13, 17 (1998)
(finding that, in one randomized controlled trial in Switzerland testing the outcomes between
a group receiving heroin administration versus conventional methadone maintenance, there
were clear benefits for the first group, yet less than half of the latter chose to receive
heroin administration at the end of the study, with most preferring to continue medication methadone); Ambros Uchtenhagen, The Role and Function of Heroin Assisted Treatment at the
Treatment System Level, 19 HEROIN ADDICTION & RELATED CLINICAL PROBS. 5, 7 (2017)
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D. Evidence from Other Countries
An enormous body of research suggests that DOT-P would provide
considerable benefits in the United States without any substantial countervailing harms. Understanding the benefits of DOT-P requires drawing from
experience and evaluations related to different interventions focusing on
different problems. DOT-P integrates some of the most beneficial features
of SCFs, OAT, iOAT, and DOT in the care of people with diseases like
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. In this section, we review research documenting
these benefits with less emphasis on SCFs, OAT and DOT, only because they
have been the focus of so many research reviews recently or previously.
A clinic providing DOT-P would provide medical supervision for
people while they experience opioid-related intoxication, which is one of the
key benefits of SCFs. Research has established that SCF personnel can
effectively reverse overdoses when they occur, saving thousands of lives
across the over 160 SCFs that currently operate around the world.91 It is
estimated that opening a SCF in Philadelphia, for example, would result in
immediate reduction up to 76 fatal overdoses each year.92 These facilities also
provide a secure and hygienic space, which minimizes the risk of infections
or other injuries.93 Almost all SCFs offer health and social services, including

(finding that less than 10% of people receiving treatment for OUD in Switzerland are enrolled in DOT-P). Moreover, research on Supervised Consumption Facilities suggests that
people who are stably housed are likely to continue injecting at home whenever possible if a
facility opened. See Robert Harris et al., Perceptions About Supervised Injection Facilities
Among People Who Inject Drugs in Philadelphia, 52 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 56, 57-58 (2018)
(noting from interviews with people who inject drugs a clear preference for injection at home for
those stably housed and only likely use of a facility among those lacking stable housing).
91
See Chloé Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services: What Has Been Demonstrated?
A Systematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 48, 62-64 (2014) (finding
that the presence of healthcare workers in SCFs improved the outcome of overdose cases).
92
See SHARON LARSON ET AL., MAIN LINE HEALTH CTR. FOR POPULATION HEALTH RES.,
SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION FACILITIES—REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 6-7 (2017), https://
dbhids.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/OTF_LarsonS_PHLReportOnSCF_Dec2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4NQ-PUCH] (finding that overdose deaths in Philadelphia could be
reduced by 24 to 76 annually by creating SCFs).
93
See EA Enns et al., Potential Cost-Effectiveness of Supervised Injection Facilities in
Toronto and Ottawa, Canada, 111 ADDICTION 475, 485 (2015) (describing reductions in
infections associated with SCFs in Toronto and Ottawa).
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access to drug treatment.94 Perhaps most importantly, research documents
that the most vulnerable people who inject drugs, including those at high risk
for serious health conditions and unstable housing, are willing to use SCFs to
improve their health and the health of the community.95 It is also important
to note that SCFs have been associated with improved community health and
that no negative community effects have been observed.96
It is clear that OUD is partly a physiological phenomenon.97 It is
hardly surprising then that treatment with medications that target related
neurochemical pathways is more effective than abstinence or behavioral
interventions at reducing the harm of unmanaged OUD and at bridging the
gap to long-term detoxification. Patients receiving methadone are over four
times more likely to remain engaged in treatment compared to patients

94

See, e.g., Larson et al., supra note 92, at 26 (“Generally, SCFs offer an array of other
comprehensive health and social services, including detoxification and other substance use
treatment services, medical care, counseling, and legal assistance.”); Thomas Kerr et al.,
A Micro-Environmental Intervention to Reduce the Harms Associated with Drug-Related
Overdose: Evidence from the Evaluation of Vancouver's Safer Injection Facility, 18
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 37, 38 (2007) (finding that SCFs in Vancouver typically refer drug
users to health and social services, in addition to providing safe spaces for drug use).
95
See, e.g., BA Bouvier et al., Willingness to Use a Supervised Injection Facility among
Young Adults Who Use Prescription Opioids Non-Medically: A Cross-Sectional Study, 14
HARM REDUCTION J., 2017, at 1, 7 (“If a SIF were opened, more than six in ten of our study
participants reported they would use the service, and more than eight in ten of participants
who have injected drugs reported they would use the service.”); Alex Kral et al., Acceptability
of a Safer Injection Facility Among Injection Drug Users in San Francisco, 110 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 160, 161 (2010) (“Eighty-five percent [of injection drug users] said
that they would use a [safer injection facility] should it be convenient for them.”); Harris et
al., supra note 87, at 57-58 (noting that in interviews of people who inject drugs those who
inject in public settings would use a SCF in part to avoid exposing people in the community
to their public drug use and intoxication).
96
Potier et al., supra note 91, at 63 (noting that there have been no additional observed harms
and fewer injection materials discarded in public in neighborhoods with established SCFs).
97
That opioids target pain receptors and reward endorphins explains much of their attraction.
This neurochemical process is easily observable in functional brain scans. See e.g., Henry
W. Chase, The Neural Basis of Drug Stimulus Processing and Craving: An Activation Likelihood
Estimation Meta-Analysis, 70 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 785, 787 (2011) (explaining metaanalysis studies of brain imaging, showing cue responses effects for people with substance use
disorders). Though this neurochemical effect is often more proximal and psychological
issues are often more distal, they are fully and inextricably linked. See, e.g., Igor Elman &
David Borsook, The Failing Cascade: Comorbid Post Traumatic Stress and Opioid Use
Disorders, 103 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 374, 379 (2019) (finding a
common neurological foundation between PTSD and opioid use disorder).
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receiving a placebo.98 Opioid Agonist Therapy (OAT) with methadone and
buprenorphine are the “gold standard” treatments for OUD.99
Despite the benefits of OAT, some patients on these medications do
continue or return to active, unmanaged consumption of illicit drugs;100 others
avoid these medications because of a variety of logistical, resource, and
stigma factors.101 Another strategy for reducing harms among people who
struggle to start or adhere to OAT or other supportive services is iOAT, which
involves providing pharmaceutical-grade heroin or hydromorphone to people
for self-administration.102 To date, nine randomized controlled trials103 have
evaluated interventions that are programmatically similar to iOAT and
DOT-P. The trials provided opioids other than methadone or buprenorphine to
people who would otherwise consume street drugs.104 The first was conducted
98

Fentanyl: The Next Wave of the Opioid Crisis: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 82 (2017)
(statement of Wilson M. Compton, Deputy Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse).
99
Hilary Smith Connery, Medication-Assisted Treatment of Opioid Use Disorder: Review of
the Evidence and Future Directions, 23 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 63, 64 (2015) (“The evidence
for efficacy both in reducing opioid use and retaining patients in care is strongest for agonist
treatment; methadone maintenance remains the gold standard of care for OUD.”).
100
Brittany Burns Dennis et al., The Effectiveness of Opioid Substitution Treatments for
Patients with Opioid Dependence: A Systematic Review and Multiple Treatment Comparison
Protocol, 3 SYSTEMATIC REVS., Sept. 19, 2014, at 1, 1-2; see also Ada Lo et al., Factors
Associated with Methadone Maintenance Therapy Discontinuation Among People Who
Inject Drugs, 94 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 43 (2018) (noting that only 35-54% of
patients continue with methadone treatment through the first year, meaning that over half of
patients who initiate methadone treatment will cease treatment and resume using nonprescription opioids within twelve months).
101
See Yarborough et al., supra note 7777, at 114-15 (2016) (delineating the many barriers
individuals face and perceive when making decisions about OAT treatment).
102
Guidelines for the delivery of iOAT in Canada were released earlier this fall. See generally
Nadia Fairbairn et al., Injectable Opioid Agonist Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder: A
National Clinical Guideline, 191 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. E1049 (2019) (identifying best
practices and laying out recommendations for iOAT with injectable heroin and hydromorphone for individuals with severe OUD).
103
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) are the gold standard for assessing the causal effects
of an intervention. The FDA generally requires one large RCT demonstrating the efficacy of
a drug compared to a similar product or therapy before it can be approved to enter the commercial market. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b) (2018) (emphasizing that when approving new
drug applications, an “adequate and well-controlled study” includes randomization and control
groups, while not explicitly describing these studies as RCTs).
104
See generally Isabelle Demaret et al., Efficacy of Heroin-Assisted Treatment in Belgium:
A Randomised Controlled Trial, 21 EUR. ADDICTION RES. 179 (2015); Christian Haasen et
al., Heroin-Assisted Treatment for Opioid Dependence: Randomised Controlled Trial, 191
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 55 (2007); Richard L. Hartnoll et al., Evaluation of Heroin Maintenance in Controlled Trial, 37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 877 (1980); Joan Carles March
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in 1980, when ninety-six high-functioning heroin users in London were
randomly assigned to receive a prescription for home-use heroin or methadone.105 After twelve months, patients receiving the heroin prescription had
fewer arrests and higher treatment adherence compared to patients receiving
methadone.106 Social and health outcomes were otherwise stable and similar.107
The second trial began in 1995, in Switzerland, with fifty-one participants.108
Unlike their counterparts in the United Kingdom, the Swiss participants
had significantly greater physical and social challenges including more
unemployment, mental illness, and participation in high-risk practices.109
Patients receiving heroin, which was administered by healthcare providers
three times daily, experienced significantly better physical, social, emotional,
and mental functioning at the end of the trial compared to the control group.110
Researchers in the Netherlands completed a much larger and more
complex trial a few years later when they randomly assigned 549 treatmentresistant heroin users to either standard methadone medication treatment or
methadone medication treatment with the option of being administered

et al., Controlled Trial of Prescribed Heroin in the Treatment of Opioid Addiction, 31 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 203 (2006); Eugenia Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone for the Treatment of Opioid Addiction, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 777
(2009) [hereinafter Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone]; Eugenia
Oviedo-Joekes et al., Hydromorphone Compared with Diacetylmorphine for Long-Term
Opioid Dependence: A Randomized Clinical Trial, 73 [J]AMA PSYCHIATRY 447 (2016)
[hereinafter Oviedo-Joekes et al., Hydromorphone Compared with Diacetylmorphine];
Perneger et al., supra note 90; John Strang et al. Supervised Injectable Heroin or Injectable
Methadone Versus Optimised Oral Methadone as Treatment for Chronic Heroin Addicts in
England After Persistent Failure in Orthodox Treatment (RIOTT): A Randomised Trial, 375
LANCET 1885 (2010); Wim van den Brink et al., Medical Prescription of Heroin to Treatment Resistant Heroin Addicts: Two Randomised Controlled Trials, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 310
(2003). The evidence base is nicely summarized in a recent RAND report. See KILMER ET
AL., supra note 68, at iii (“This mixed-methods report assesses evidence on and arguments
made about HAT and SCSs and examines some of the issues associated with implementing them
in the United States.”).
105
These patients were considered high functioning because many were able to remain
employed either full- or part-time and they experienced relatively good health. See Hartnoll
et al., supra note 104, at 881 (noting that 32% of participants were employed full time at
intake and only 10% of both groups experienced bad health).
106
See id. at 880-81 (noting that 48% of HAT patients had no arrests, whereas only 28% of MMT
patients had no arrests; that 32% of MMT patients spent time in prison compared to 19% of
HAT patients; and that over 12 months, 74% of HAT patients continued to receive their
prescriptions compared to only 29% of MMT patients). This study was essentially an RCT of
drug control because denial of HAT was otherwise available.
107
Id.
108
See Perneger et al., supra note 90, at 14-17.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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heroin.111 Once again, the group with access to heroin administration experienced better outcomes, measured by a composite functioning index,
compared to the group that only received normal treatment with methadone.112
The benefits for those in the treatment group notably dissipated in the two
months after their heroin treatment stopped.113
A small fourth trial was completed in Spain in 2006, with a focus on
people engaging in injection drug use with other serious co-occurring conditions.114 In the control group, oral methadone was dispensed to patients
once a day.115 The patients in the treatment group received heroin in the
morning and at night along with one dose of oral methadone around 8 p.m.116
Yet again, compared with the control group, the treatment group experienced
improved general health status, decreased drug-related problems, and reduced
HIV-related risk behavior.117 The findings from a large trial in Germany
emerged in 2007.118 Across multiple cities, researchers randomly assigned
over 1,000 participants with opioid dependence to receive heroin for selfadministration under supervision in outpatient clinics or standard methadone
treatment.119 Consistent with previous trials, retention was substantially
higher in the group receiving heroin, as were improvements in self-reported
health.120 There was, once again, a much larger reduction in illicit use of street
drugs in the group receiving heroin.121
The first trial in North America reported findings in 2009 from the
random assignment of 251 long-term users of injectable heroin with a history
111

See van den Brink et al., supra note 104, at 310-12; see also Isabelle Demaret et al., Loss
of Treatment Benefit When Heroin-Assisted Treatment is Stopped after 12 Months, 69 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 72, 74 (2016) (noting that the benefits of treatment in a
Belgian study totally dissipated and that those receiving heroin returned to active use of street
drugs at the same rate of those in the control group).
112
van den Brink et al., supra note 104, at 310-12.
113
Id. at 311-12.
114
See March et al., supra note 104, at 204 (conducting the study specifically to address
injection drug use in individuals with at least two of the following: “infectious disease related
to intravenous drug use, mental health problems, and social maladjustment”).
115
Id. at 205.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 208-09 (finding that patients receiving HAT had approximately three times fewer
days engaging in criminal activity compared to MMT control patients and higher score of
general health—2.5 times higher than the control group—including avoiding behaviors correlated
with contracting HIV and that “[t]he rate of improvement was higher within the DAM group, as
compared with the control group, in terms of general health status[,] . . . drug related
problems, and reduced HIV-risk behavior”).
118
See Haasen et al., supra note 104, at 55, 57, 59-60.
119
Id. at 55.
120
Id. at 57, 59.
121
Id. at 58-59.
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of relapse after one or more treatments with methadone who were living in
Vancouver.122 Retention was significantly higher in the treatment group,
as was the reduction in illicit-drug use and other illegal activity.123 Some
overdoses were observed and reversed, leading the researchers to conclude
that such treatment should be medically supervised.124 The following year,
researchers reported on a trial in London evaluating the effects of the
assignment of 301 patients to supervised injectable methadone, supervised
injectable heroin, and optimized oral methadone.125 Treatment with supervised
injectable heroin led to immediate and significant reductions in the use of illicit
heroin compared with supervised injectable methadone or oral methadone.126
An eighth trial was conducted in Belgium where seventy-four participants
were randomly assigned to supervised self-administration of heroin or
methadone prescriptions for home use. After twelve months, participants
in the treatment group reported significantly less illicit drug use and significantly
better physical and mental health.127
In the most recent trial, completed in 2011, researchers explored
whether the benefits of heroin-administration could be replicated with hydromorphone.128 In this non-inferiority trial, 202 long-term street opioid injectors
were randomly assigned to receive either injectable heroin or hydromorphone
(up to three times daily) for six months under supervision.129 The researchers
observed equivalent benefits—that is, with no statistically significant differences—in the form of reduced street heroin use and reduced use of any street
opioids.130 There were fewer adverse events such as seizures and overdoses
in the group receiving hydromorphone.131
The delivery of iOAT has occurred with and without clinical supervision. Although some people do not require supervision, for others supervision is
likely to offer a number of important benefits. These benefits are evident from
the broader experience of Directly-Observed Therapy in other contexts. DOT
122

Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone, supra note 104, at 779.
See id. at 782 (observing a 43.5% reduction in illicit drug usage and illegal activities in
the HAT group relative to 28.8% in the MMT group and an 87.8% retention rate in the HAT
group compared to a 54.1% rate in the MMT group).
124
Id. at 784.
125
Strang et al., supra note 104.
126
Id. at 1891-92.
127
Demaret et al., supra note 104, at 183-85.
128
Oviedo-Joekes et al. Hydromorphone Compared with Diacetylmorphine, supra note 104,
at 448-49.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 452-53.
131
See id. at 447 (reporting from a study conducted with 202 patients and the efficacy of
hydromorphone as a substitute for diacetylmorphine was evaluated through measuring the
days of street heroin use in each group, with the assumption that street heroin use is inversely
correlated to efficacy).
123
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is the standard of care for ensuring compliance with treatment protocols when
noncompliance can produce serious individual or communal harm, as with the
development of drug resistant tuberculosis when medication is discontinued.132
There is a long history of culturally sensitive DOT, which addresses potential
nonadherence not through after-the-fact punishment, which does not work,
but through extensive social supports.133
These studies collectively suggest that DOT-P would improve the
quality of life for individuals with OUD, provide benefits to the community,
and would not result in other harms. Two systematic reviews134 emphasize
that the relative advantage of iOAT compared with methadone treatment is
greater for individuals with severe OUD,135 who are more likely to experience
homelessness136 and have co-occurring mental health disorders. 137 DOT-P

132

See C. Patrick Chaulk et al., Eleven Years of Community-Based Directly Observed Therapy
for Tuberculosis, 274 [J]AMA 945, 949-50 (1995) (reporting on a substantial decline in
TB following implementation of community-based DOT in Baltimore despite prevalent risk
factors); Stephen E. Weis et al., The Effect of Directly Observed Therapy on the Rates of Drug
Resistance and Relapse in Tuberculosis, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1179, 1182 (1994) (reporting
from observation of over 400 patients receiving traditional treatment for tuberculosis and over 580
patients receiving DOT that DOT was associated with less drug resistance and fewer relapses).
133
See, e.g., Jimmy Volmink, Patrice Matchaba & Paul Garner, Directly Observed Therapy
and Treatment Adherence, 355 LANCET 1345, 1346-49 (2000) (reviewing other strategies to
improve and augment DOT with a focus on patients’ needs, convenience, and relationships).
134
Marica Ferri, Marina Davoli & Carla A. Perucci, Heroin Maintenance for Chronic HeroinDependent Individuals, 12 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., no. 12, 2011, at 1;
John Strang et al., Heroin on Trial: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomised
Trials of Diamorphine-Prescribing as Treatment for Refractory Heroin Addiction, 207 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 5 (2015).
135
See Marcel G.W. Dijkgraaf et al., Cost Utility Analysis of Co-Prescribed Heroin Compared with Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Heroin Addicts in Two Randomised Trials,
330 BRIT. MED. J. 1297, 1299 (2005) (reporting that the program of prescribing heroin with
methadone in the Netherlands resulted in an average savings of $16,122 per patient per year
when compared to methadone treatment alone).
136
See Lo et al., supra note 100, at 41, 73 (noting that patients experiencing homelessness
during treatment are 2.5 times more likely to stop MMT).
137
See William C. Becker et al., Non-Medical Use, Abuse and Dependence On Prescription
Opioids Among U.S. Adults: Psychiatric, Medical and Substance Use Correlates, 94 DRUG
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 38, 38 (2008) (“Among those with past-year non-medical prescription
opioid use, those with abuse/dependence were [70%] more likely to have panic and social
phobic/agoraphobic symptoms.”). Antidepressants increased the efficacy of patients receiving
agonist therapy of opioid dependence in a meta-analysis of eight RCTs, leading to a 2.3 times
reduction in depressive symptoms when compared to control patients. Ahmed N. Hassan et
al., Management of Mood and Anxiety Disorders in Patients Receiving Opioid Agonist Therapy:
Review and Meta-analysis, 26 AM. J. ADDICTION 551, 551 (2017). These data suggest that the prevalence of clinical depression among patients receiving agonist therapy for opioid addiction is high.
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and iOAT have the built-in advantages of preventing criminal activity138
associated with obtaining illicit drugs and preventing harms that occur
with the injection of drugs of unknown purity.139
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Clinical Care, Instead of Self-Medication, for John
One day an outreach worker invites John to visit a local specialized
clinic. At the clinic, John’s various conditions are diagnosed. The clinic
physician documents that John is in considerable pain, which is exacerbating and complicated by a secondary diagnosis of opioid dependence.
John is on his feet most of the day or resting on a hard sidewalk. When he
has to scramble to stave off withdrawal, it is excruciating limping from
one place to another. The clinic physician describes the following course
of treatment: John can come into the clinic and be administered hydromorphone as many times as needed to treat his pain between 6 AM and 10 PM,
as long as he spends time in the clinic after so that staff can be sure he is
not at risk of overdose. Dosing is determined by clinic staff in close collaboration with John to treat his pain without producing or intensifying
hyperalgesia. If he wants to start maintenance or detoxification therapy,
he can access methadone or buprenorphine at an affiliated clinic next door.
John is encouraged to stay off his feet as much as possible to give his leg
adequate time to heal. The facility has respite housing to enable such rest.
Given the benefits to John and to the community, it is likely that
the locality and state would support such care for John. 140 But federal law
138

In Spain, patients receiving heroin had more days free of crime than the control group
receiving methadone, from eleven days per month to less than one day a month. March
et al., supra note 104, at 208. Swiss patients receiving in the control arm acquired 3123
Swiss francs in illicit income before treatment and 4931 after treatment, whereas treated
patients reduced their illicit income from 3372 to 311. Perneger et al., supra note 90, at
16. In Canada, patients receiving diacetylmorphine were 40% more likely to demonstrate
a reduction in illegal activities and illegal drug use relative to patients receiving methadone. Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone, supra note 104, at 782.
139
Only 1.5% of patients receiving heroin in Switzerland experienced an overdose event
during six months of treatment whereas 48% experienced an overdose event in the six
months preceding treatment. Perneger et al., supra note 90, at 15. Overdoses that occur at Swiss
facilities are routinely reversed. KILMER ET AL., supra note 68, at x (noting that thousands of overdoses have occurred over thirty years with no or only a few fatal overdoses).
140
They may also very well not. State legislatures and state boards of medicine could
prevent such a facility from opening, as could local officials. Analysis of the legal and
political mechanisms related to states and localities is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Broadly speaking, though, we think it reasonable that a locality like Philadelphia

94

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[November 2019

enforcement is fickle, ideological, and politically distanced from individual people and communities. Local Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) officials might condemn or even bring charges against a clinic caring for John in this way. In the next three Sections we provide context that
would guide courts in assessing such a case.
B. Federal Regulation of Medicine Generally: Hands-Off
Since the founding of the country, medicine has been regulated
predominantly at the local and state levels.141 This is operationalized primarily through licensing: states delegate authority to physicians to define
educational standards, specify the limits of practice through informal and
formal rulemaking, and enforce rules through professional self-regulation.142

would support a pain-centered approach and that state officials would not interfere.
See Kate Kilpatrick, Philadelphia’s Plan for Opioid Safe Injection Site Splits Opinion,
GUARDIAN (July 18, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/
18/philadelphia-opioid-safe-injection-site-plan [https://perma.cc/89LC-6NUP] (discussing
the push and pull between stakeholders in Kensington, the Philadelphia neighborhood most
likely to see the implementation of an SCF if its legality is ultimately decided).
141
The practice of medicine emerged from public health practice. And public health practice is the paradigmatic example of police power. See, e.g., Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (noting regulation of health and safety
is “primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern”); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347
U.S. 442, 449 (1954) (“It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce
standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital
part of a state’s police power. The state’s discretion in that field extends naturally to the
regulation of all professions concerned with health.”); State v. Gee, 236 P.2d 1029, 1033
(Ariz. 1951) (noting in concluding that it is unquestioned that state legislatures have the
power and duty to control and regulate the health professions and practices affecting the
public health and welfare including the definition of terms like “healing”).
142
See, e.g., ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY,
CONFRONTATION, AND COMPROMISE 19 (2007) (noting that the “cornerstone” of medical
practice regulation is states’ licensing schemes). In some cases, state boards also might take
actions to prevent unlicensed individuals from practicing medicine. Timothy S. Jost et
al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look at Medical Licensure
Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 309, 326-30 (1993).
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Congress has respected this arrangement for historical,143 political,144 and instrumental reasons.145
There are notable exceptions. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) regulates the approval and marketing of pharmaceuticals, and other
various agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
and the DEA restrict availability of controlled substances to approved uses146
143

“Early in United States history, most acts considered crimes were subject only to
state criminal law. Federal criminal laws were limited to areas in which the Constitution
gave Congress specifically enumerated powers. Over time, Congress began to criminalize
much ordinary criminal activity under the guise of regulating interstate commerce. With the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, however, Congress established virtually unlimited
federal jurisdiction for all drug offenses as a way to protect public morals—without
even the pretense of regulating interstate commerce.” Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual
Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 1159, 1165-66 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
144
See PAUL STARR , THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 2 (2d ed.
2017) (describing the ability of the American Medical Association from the 1940s until
the 1970s to prevent regulatory encroachments, including calls for universal insurance or
other restraints on practice through concentrated lobbying).
145
The decentralization of lawmaking authority has enabled a vigorous policy learning
process in the United States in which states and localities implement policy innovations,
which are evaluated, providing data for ongoing reform and dissemination in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Scott Burris & Evan Anderson, Legal Regulation of
Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public Health Law Research, 9 ANN . REV.
L. SOC. SCI. 95, 106-07 (2013) (finding that research on legal interventions regarding
individual health behavior determines how and why certain laws may fail or succeed);
see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
146
The Fifth Circuit stated:
Congress fashioned the Comprehensive Drug Control Act to provide a
closed system of drug distribution for legitimate handlers of such drugs.
Such a closed system should significantly reduce the widespread diversion
of these drugs out of legitimate channels into the illicit market, while at
the same time providing the legitimate drug industry with a unified approach to narcotic and dangerous drug control.
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1973) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The primary role of the DEA is to prevent the diversion of substances into illicit channels.
Under the CSA, the DEA is responsible for preventing, detecting, and investigating the
diversion of controlled substances while ensuring the availability of these drugs for legitimate
use. U.S. Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Drug Enforcement Administration,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/dea.htm [https://
perma.cc/A9WC-PHGD] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (discussing the DEA‘s mission). The
primary role of HHS, operating through the FDA, under the CSA is to perform technocratic
medical assessments of controlled substances and provide recommendations to the DEA in
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based on their classification on five drug schedules.147 The DEA also determines who can interact with scheduled substances, which, importantly for our
purposes, includes the registration of clinicians.148
These regulatory schemes position the federal government as a gatekeeper of pharmaceutical therapy. Schedule I substances are kept outside the
gate, a substantial barrier to effective medical practice and research.149 But
physicians retain broad authority to administer, dispense, and prescribe for
any legitimate medical purpose all other substances once the FDA approves
them for medical use. The definition of what constitutes legitimate medical
practice is left to self-governing boards and extends well beyond federally
approved uses of drugs.150 The statutes that define the gatekeeping role of

regard to scheduling and other CSA-related decisions. Controlled Substance Staff Functional
Roles, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-evaluationand-research-cder/controlled-substance-staff-functional-roles [https://perma.cc/345A-924S]
(last updated July 9, 2018).
147
See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2018) (listing the schedules under which narcotic drugs are classified).
The CSA and associated laws regulate access to controlled substances throughout the supply
chain from production to dispensing. See generally, e.g., Evan Anderson & Corey Davis,
Breaking the Cycle of Preventable Suffering: Fulfilling the Principle of Balance, 24 TEMPLE
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 329 (2010) (discussing how international agreements and conventions
govern the international drug control system).
148
See U.S. Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Drug Enforcement Administration,
supra note 146. The registration requirement for individuals interacting with scheduled
narcotics, including clinicians, is found at 21 U.S.C. § 823.
149
Schedule I substances are classified as having no currently accepted medical use and high
potential for abuse yet include heroin, which is widely used as a medication for opioid dependence and for analgesia in other places, and marijuana (cannabis), which is now permitted in
medical and recreation use. See supra text accompanying notes 103-31 (describing the medical
benefits of using heroin, a schedule I narcotic, to treat OUD); infra text accompanying note
292 (observing that the federal government’s oblique recognition of marijuana’s medical value
by refraining from prosecuting individuals for its prescribed uses despite its being a schedule I
narcotic). While an important practical limitation, placement of substances into Schedule I is
in some sense not an example of federal regulation of medicine because the substances are
deemed to have no medical applications. See David B. Brushwood, Defining “Legitimate Medical Purpose”, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 306, 307 (2005) (“A practice that is medical
is legitimate and is legal under the DEA regulation. DEA does not regulate within medical
practice but simply discerns whether a practice is medical or nonmedical.”).
150
Indeed, so-called off-label prescribing is a common and widely accepted practice. The
Supreme Court has supported and even encouraged the off-label use of FDA regulated drugs.
See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (holding that off-label
use is an “accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area
without directly interfering with the practice of medicine”).
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the FDA, DEA and HHS explicitly claim not to otherwise interfere with
legitimate medical practice.151
Since medicine became a mature profession,152 very few cases have
explored putative transgressions of federal gatekeeping rules by clinicians
providing care in good faith. One commonly cited guidepost is the Supreme
Court’s Moore decision from 1975.153 But it offers little practical guidance:
Moore wantonly prescribed methadone for home-use to hundreds of people
a day without any meaningful medical evaluation while billing based on the
amount prescribed and not medical services provided.154 The Supreme Court
allowed the DEA to treat Moore like a “large-scale pusher”155 rather than a
bona fide physician. Lower federal courts have issued analogous rulings
related to similarly venal activity.156 Even in these instances, however, courts
151

The Food Drug and Cosmetics Act’s (FDCA) authorizing language is explicit that it
should not “be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner
to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device . . . within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship.” 21 U.S.C. § 396; id. § 801a(3) (“[N]othing in the Convention
will interfere with ethical medical practice in this country as determined by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services on the basis of a consensus of the views of the American medical
and scientific community.”). Similar language in other federal laws also preserves the practice of
medicine’s special status, leaving it generally unregulated at the federal level. The Social
Security Amendments of 1954, for example, provided that “[n]othing in this title shall be
construed as authorizing the Commissioner of Social Security or any other officer or
employee of the United States to interfere in any way with the practice of medicine . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 416 (1954); see also 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(H)(i) (2018) (“Nothing in such regulations
or practice guidelines may authorize any Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”).
152
See infra text accompanying notes 178-84 (discussing cases in the 1910s and 1920s,
when addiction-treatment exceptionalism emerged, and before medicine had established
consistent therapeutic benefits).
153
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
154
Moore issued over 11,000 prescriptions for methadone in a five-month period, which translated into over 800,000 methadone tablets and over 100 prescriptions a day. Id. at 126. He billed
based on the quantity prescribed not the performance of a medical service. Id. Unlike typical
medical care, and certainly medical care culminating in opioid therapy, he provided “only the
most perfunctory examination” and typically provided a prescription for the amount of methadone requested. Id. On return visits, Moore issued refills without another medical examination.
Id. These practices yielded in excess of $200,000 over this time period. Id.
155
Id. at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that there
was probable cause to admit evidence from defendant’s practice because it was “permeated
with the illegal distribution of drugs,” from high initiation and maintenance fees paid in cash
to prescribing heavy narcotics doses); United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir.
2004) (upholding a lower court’s finding that the defendant acted without a legitimate medical purpose in distributing hydrocodone prescriptions over the internet and hiding proceeds
of sales); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (reiterating that defendant’s
knowledge that he dispensed drugs based on forged prescriptions was sufficient evidence to
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have noted that while the FDA “was obviously intended to control the
availability of drugs for prescribing by physicians,” it “did not purport to
regulate the practice of medicine.”157 There are no cases in the appellate record
on our reading that examine good faith divergences.158
Given that healthcare delivery has been regulated by the states historically, DOT-P would also implicate principles of preemption. These principles
provide few if any hard limits on federal power. Despite the longstanding norm
of federal noninterference in medicine, it is clear that the federal government
can regulate medical practice if it makes its intention to do so clear and unambiguous. Supreme Court jurisprudence related to marijuana underscores the
special breadth and dominance of federal power over drug control.159
Though the Court’s preemption jurisprudence does not insulate states
from federal intrusions, there is a longstanding presumption against preemption,
particularly in areas of traditional state regulation.160 This presumption colored
the resolution of another controversy over whether states or the federal
show that that activity was outside of the course of professional practice); United States v.
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 200 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding the conviction of a physician
who prescribed opioids to undercover agents without any physical examination).
157
United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Regenerative Sci., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Defendants state[d] that
Congress has left the practice of medicine to the States to regulate. FDA does not disagree
with these principles.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MANHATTAN INST., THE FDA’S MISGUIDED
REGULATION OF STEM-CELL PROCEDURES: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE OVERREACH BLOCKS
MEDICAL INNOVATION 12 (2013) (describing the regulation of medical practice as distinct
from the FDA’s regulation of drugs and biologics).
158
This is not surprising. The prevailing model for understanding physician overprescribing
does not recognize good faith innovations or reasonable extensions of the traditional practice.
See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and Hard Place: Can
Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42
AM. J.L. MED. 7, 15-18 (describing and criticizing the AMA’s heuristic for categorizing
overprescribing oriented around the “four Ds,” which refer to physicians who are dated,
duped, disabled, and dishonest).
159
After California authorized home production and home use of marijuana for medical
purposes in the late 1990s, federal officials continued to enforce federal prohibitions on all
marijuana-related activity. In dispensing with any pretense of a limiting principle for federal
drug control pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court’s decision in Raich threw
out an injunction aiming to stop federal law enforcement from interfering with activity that
California had authorized. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005); see also id. at 49
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s definition of economic activity for purposes of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence threatens to sweep all of productive human activity into
federal regulatory reach.”).
160
See Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217,
1223 (evaluating the most recent decades in Supreme Court jurisprudence and affirming that
the presumption against preemption continues to “operate as a meaningful default rule in
express preemption cases” where there is no clarity from Congress).
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government define medical practice with controlled substances. In 1999,
Congress failed to pass an act prohibiting use of controlled substances for
physician-assisted suicide161 because of widespread concern among lawmakers
that it impermissibly federalized regulation of medicine.162 The Attorney
General sought the same result by issuing an interpretive rule stating that
physician-assisted suicide is not legitimate medical practice.163 The rule
would have exposed clinicians in Oregon to criminal prosecution under the
federal law, even if they complied with all the requirements of the state’s
Death with Dignity statute.164
According to the Supreme Court, the Attorney General lacked such
authority. The Court reached this result through a narrow interpretation of the
power of the Attorney General to promulgate rules.165 It was “evident” that
“Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General authority to carry out or
effect all provisions of the [Controlled Substances Act (CSA)]. Rather, he
can promulgate rules relating only to ‘registration’ and ‘control,’ and ‘for the

161

The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (2000).
See, e.g., Pain Relief Promotion Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 22 (2000) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden) (“[The bill] would allow the Federal Government to intrude into the doctor-patient relationship at one of the most difficult and
personal times of an individual's life.”); S. REP. NO. 106-299, at 61 (2000) (“[T]his poorly
written, poorly thought-out statute would wreak havoc on States’ traditional police authority
to regulate their own doctors—an authority they have enjoyed for more than 200 years . . . .
In our view, the DEA is not qualified to handle investigations into allegation [sic] of the
misuse of pain management drugs.”).
163
According to the interpretive rule,
assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the meaning
of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and . . . prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances Act. Such conduct by a physician registered to dispense
controlled substances may “render his registration . . . inconsistent with
the public interest” and therefore subject [it] to possible suspension or revocation under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The Attorney General’s conclusion applies regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits such conduct by
practitioners or others and regardless of the condition of the person whose
suicide is assisted.
66 Fed. Reg. 56,608, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
164
Id.
165
See 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2018) (providing that the Attorney General may “promulgate rules
. . . relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of
controlled substances.”); id. § 871(b) (authorizing the Attorney General to “promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures which he may deem necessary and appropriate for
the efficient execution of his functions under this subchapter”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 259 (2006) (“The CSA gives the Attorney General limited powers, to be exercised
in specific ways.”).
162
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efficient execution of his functions’ under the statute.”166 These provisions,
according to the Court, do not empower the Attorney General “to make a rule
declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and treatment of patients
that is specifically authorized under state law.”167 This reading of the statute
relied on an understanding that Attorney General “control” under the CSA is
limited to the prevention of diversion.168
It is important not to read too much into the Oregon decision. The
outcome might have differed if the Attorney General had used notice and
comment rulemaking or if the rulemaking had come from the Secretary of
HHS.169 Nevertheless, in striking down the interpretive rule, the Court explained
that “Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from using
their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing
and trafficking,” but the CSA “manifests no intent to regulate the practice of
medicine generally.”170 The Court did, however, note that “[e]ven though regulation of health and safety is primarily, and historically, a matter of local
concern, there is no question that the Federal Government can set uniform
national standards in these areas.”171 The Court ended that sentence by listing
a section of the Public Health Services Act,172 to which we now turn.
C. Federal Regulation of OUD Treatment: Hands-On (The Exception)

166

Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 259. The limits on the Attorney General’s authority under § 821 are
discussed further below. As to § 871, the Court wrote:
This section allows the Attorney General to best determine how to execute
“his functions.” It is quite a different matter, however, to say that the Attorney General can define the substantive standards of medical practice as
part of his authority. To find a delegation of this extent in § 871 would put
that part of the statute in considerable tension with the narrowly defined
delegation concerning control and registration. It would go, moreover,
against the plain language of the text to treat a delegation for the “execution” of his functions as a further delegation to define other functions well
beyond the statute’s specific grants of authority.
Id. at 264-65.
167
Id. at 258.
168
See id. at 260 (“The statutory references to ‘control’ outside the scheduling context make
clear that the Attorney General can establish controls ‘against diversion,’ e.g., §823(a)(1), but do
not give him authority to define diversion based on his view of legitimate medical practice.”).
169
See id. at 265 (“The CSA allocates decision making powers among statutory actors so that
medical judgments, if they are to be decided at the federal level and for the limited objects
of the statute, are placed in the hands of the Secretary [of HHS].”).
170
Id. at 270.
171
Id. at 271.
172
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 290bb-2a (2018).
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The Supreme Court has found one exception in which the federal
government does appear to regulate medical practice: maintenance and
detoxification treatment.173 It is a longstanding and curious exception. Prior
to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act in 1914, controlled substances were
mostly unregulated.174 Pursuant to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, all distribution of heroin, morphine, and cocaine was banned except for prescriptions
“by a physician . . . in the course of his professional practice.”175
Physicians, who were still transforming from a trade to a profession,176
tested the limits of this exception. The results of many of these cases were
described then and are still sometimes described today as convictions for
prescribing heroin and other drugs for “maintenance” therapy.177 The
Webb decision in 1919 in particular is billed as a firm statement by the Supreme
Court that heroin maintenance therapy is not a legitimate form of treatment.178
173

See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 271 (“In connection to the CSA, however, we find only one
area in which Congress set general, uniform standards of medical practice.”).
174
Erik Grant Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483,
486, 503-04 (1997).
175
Pub. L. No. 63-223, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 785, 786 (1914) (repealed 1939).
176
The practice of medicine transformed in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Until
that time, it was largely unregulated, and had little scientific basis. This little therapeutic
reach perpetuated limited social and political power. For example, as Victor Vaughan, dean
of the University of Michigan Medical School tellingly stated,
I served in the war with Spain in 1898, and I went time and again to a
division officer and made certain requests or offered advice. As a rule, I
was snubbed and told by action, if not by words, that I was only a medical
officer, and that I had no right to make any suggestions, and it was imprudent of me to do so. The commanding general at Chickamauga [an army
camp], when we had an increasing number of cases of typhoid fever, would
every day ostentatiously ride up to a well which had been condemned and
drink of this water to show his contempt. But in the late war I had a different
experience. I never went to a line officer with a recommendation but that
he said, “Doctor, it will be done” . . . .
STARR, supra note 144, at 141; see also MUSTO, supra note 67, at 185 (“The social and economic position of the registered physician was so sensitive [in the 1920-30s], trials so time
consuming, and appeals so long and costly, that hostile agents could make cases against physicians with impunity and nearly ruin them whether charges were warranted or not.”).
177
See Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating
the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
231, 260 (2008) (“These Supreme Court cases clearly established that registered physicians
were permitted to prescribe and dispense narcotic drugs strictly within the bounds of their
professional practice and that maintenance therapy for addicts was not within such bounds.
They set the stage for practitioner investigations and prosecutions for years to come.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178
Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); see Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context:
Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261,
280 (2010) (“In [Webb], the Court held that the legitimate practice of medicine did not
include the provision of maintenance doses of narcotics to addicts.”).
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But this is a strained reading. The issues in Webb and other cases like it were
clear examples of profiteering either incidental or totally unrelated to
maintenance therapy.179 The Court recognized the conflation in Webb a few
years later in its Linder decision. Linder had been prosecuted for prescribing a
reasonable amount of cocaine and morphine to a woman with stomach pain
following a normal medical examination, which was absent from other highprofile prosecutions.180 The Court unanimously overturned the conviction,
noting that “[o]bviously, direct control of medical practice in the states is
beyond the power of the federal government.”181
Notwithstanding the Court’s full-throated defense of medical autonomy, the arrests and prosecution of hundreds of physicians in the time period between Webb and Linder182 emboldened law enforcement and their

179

See, e.g., United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 286-89 (1922) (holding that the indictment
of a physician who prescribed to one person 150 grains of heroin, 360 grains of morphine,
and 210 grains of cocaine to one person for home use as the “patient” saw fit was proper
under the Narcotic Drug Act); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 400, 402 (1916)
(upholding the lower court’s decision to quash an indictment for flagrant and indiscriminate
morphine prescribing and charging per gram prescribed by narrowly reading the controlling
statute solely as a revenue measure and confining its narcotic regulating powers).
180
Compare Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 16-17, 22-23 (1925) (finding that the petitioner
had not violated the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act by treating his opiate-addicted patient with
a small amount of narcotics for her use alone), with United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86,
94-95 (1919) (upholding § 2 of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act as constitutional under the
taxing authority of Congress, because a large volume of drugs dispensed to one individual
likely would be sold to third parties in violation of the Act), and Behrman, 258 U.S. at 289
(upholding the indictment of a physician because, based on the enormous quantity of pills—more
than 3000 ordinary doses—allegedly prescribed to a known addict, the defendant physician
would not have been acting in the course of his professional practice).
181
As the Linder Court explained,
The enactment under consideration levies a tax . . . upon every person who
imports, manufactures, produces, compounds, sells, deals in, dispenses or
gives away opium or coca leaves or derivatives therefrom, and may regulate medical practice in the States only so far as reasonably appropriate for
or merely incidental to its enforcement. It says nothing of “addicts” and
does not undertake to prescribe methods for their medical treatment. They
are diseased and proper subjects for such treatment, and we cannot possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other
than medical purpose solely because he has dispensed to one of them, in
the ordinary course and in good faith, four small tablets of morphine or
cocaine for relief of conditions incident to addiction.
Linder, 268 U.S. at 18.
182
More than 5000 physicians were fined or jailed for these offenses between 1915 and 1938.
ARNOLD TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION 125 (1982).
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legislative allies,183 who quickly turned to limiting Linder through what can
only be described as regulatory exceptionalism.184 The resulting statutes
were consolidated in 1970 with the adoption of the CSA.185
For our purposes, the CSA does four important things: it (1) forbids
all activity with controlled substances by clinicians outside of “the course of
[their] professional practice,”186 (2) defines detoxification and maintenance
as terms of art,187 (3) limits the dispensing of schedule II substances for use
in maintenance and detoxification,188 and (4) requires clinicians providing
183
Even in the 1960s, four decades after Linder, Narcotics Bureau regulations advising doctors
and pharmacists of their rights in dealing with addicts continued to ignore what the Supreme
Court had so plainly said, and still relied on the discredited language of Webb:
An order purporting to be a prescription issued to an addict or habitual user
of narcotics, not in the course of professional treatment but for the purpose
of providing the user with narcotics sufficient to keep him comfortable by
maintaining his customary use, is not a prescription within the meaning
and intent of section 4705(c)(2), and the person filling such a [sic] order,
as well as the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties provided
for violations of the provisions of law relating to narcotic drugs.
26 C.F.R. § 151.392 (1971), repealed by 36 Fed. Reg. 7778 (Apr. 24, 1971).
184
One explanation for this exceptionalism is the meek and counter-productive actions of the
fledgling American Medical Association (AMA). Indeed, a 1924 special committee of the
AMA suggested that ambulatory treatment of narcotics addicts “begets deception, extends
the abuse of habit-forming narcotic drugs, and causes an increase in crime.” Rufus G. King,
The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62 YALE L.J.
736, 745 (1953); see also MUSTO, supra note 67, at 185 (“The social and economic position
of the registered physician was so sensitive, trials so time consuming, and appeals so long
and costly, that hostile agents could make cases against physicians with impunity and nearly
ruin them whether charges were warranted or not.”).
185
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2018)).
186
21 U.S.C. §§ 828(e); accord id. § 829.
187
As defined by the CSA,
The term “maintenance treatment” means the dispensing, for a period in
excess of twenty-one days, of a narcotic drug in the treatment of an individual for dependence upon heroin or other morphine-like drugs . . . . The
term “detoxification treatment” means the dispensing, for a period not in
excess of one hundred and eighty days, of a narcotic drug in decreasing
doses to an individual in order to alleviate adverse physiological or psychological effects incident to withdrawal from the continuous or sustained use of a narcotic drug and as a method of bringing the individual to a
narcotic drug-free state within such period.
Id. § 802 (29)–(30).
188
The CSA provides that:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), practitioners who dispense narcotic
drugs to individuals for maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment
shall obtain annually a separate registration for that purpose. The Attorney
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maintenance and detoxification to complete a special registration process.189
In sum, under the CSA, no clinician can provide maintenance or detoxification
treatment with unapproved substances without a special registration (with
limited exceptions190 ) and no clinician can do anything with controlled
substances outside of their professional practice.191
The Controlled Substances Act and the Public Health Services Act
authorize the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS to implement
the CSA through rulemaking.192 According to the Supreme Court, the rulemaking authority of the Attorney General is limited to registration and

General shall register an applicant to dispense narcotic drugs to individuals for
maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment (or both)
(A) if the applicant is a practitioner who is determined by the Secretary to
be qualified (under standards established by the Secretary) to engage in the
treatment with respect to which registration is sought;
(B) if the Attorney General determines that the applicant will comply with
standards established by the Attorney General respecting (i) security of
stocks of narcotic drugs for such treatment, and (ii) the maintenance of
records (in accordance with section 827 of this title) on such drugs; and
(C) if the Secretary determines that the applicant will comply with
standards established by the Secretary (after consultation with the Attorney
General) respecting the quantities of narcotic drugs which may be provided
for unsupervised use by individuals in such treatment.
Id. § 823.
189
Id.
190
Under the “three-day rule,” in emergency situations where the immediate relief of a
person’s acute withdrawal symptoms is necessary, while arrangements for referral to an OTP
for treatment are being made, a physician may administer narcotic drugs to that person, but
only for a maximum of three days. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b) (2018); see also Emergency
Narcotic Addiction Treatment, U.S. DEP’T JUST. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: DIVERSION
CONTROL DIVISION, https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/advisories/emerg_treat.htm
[https://perma.cc/7UGX-XCSX] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (confirming that the three-day
rule can only be invoked by unregistered practitioners to alleviate a patient’s acute withdrawal symptoms when the treatment is given in single-day doses, for no longer than 72
hours, and while arranging for the patient to enter treatment). In addition to the “three-day
rule,” the DEA permits wider latitude regarding treatment of intractable pain. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 1306.07(c).
191
21 U.S.C. § 829 (a)–(b).
192
Aside from authority over scheduling, which is not relevant for our purposes, the CSA has
two provisions authorizing the Attorney General to promulgate rules. Section 821 provides that
she may “promulgate rules . . . relating to the registration and control of the manufacture,
distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances.” Id. §821. Section 871(b) authorizes
the Attorney General to “promulgate and enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures
which he may deem necessary and appropriate for the efficient execution of his functions
under this subchapter.” Id. § 871(b).
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controlling diversion.193 This provides the basis for DEA regulations limiting
prescriptions (i.e., authorizations to obtain substances for unsupervised home
use),194 which obviously present greater risk of diversion compared to direct
administration.195 DEA regulations include a general requirement limiting
prescriptions to “legitimate medical practice”196 and a specific prohibition of prescribing Schedule II substances for maintenance or detoxification treatment.197
The HHS Secretary’s rulemaking authority is considerably broader.
The Public Health Services Act directs HHS to “determine the appropriate
methods of professional practice in the medical treatment of the narcotic
addiction of various classes of narcotic addicts,” after consultation with the
Attorney General.198 HHS has utilized this authority to promulgate regulations
restricting this practice in Opioid Treatment Programs (OTPs).199 An OTP is
a “program or practitioner engaged in opioid treatment of individuals with an
opioid agonist treatment medication registered under” the section of the CSA
193

See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 259-60 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General
“can promulgate rules relating only to registration and control, and for the efficient execution
of his functions under the statute” but cannot “define diversion based on his view of legitimate
medical practice.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
194
21 C.F.R. § 1300.01(b). “[P]rescription means an order for medication which is dispensed to
or for an ultimate user but does not include an order for medication which is dispensed
for immediate administration to the ultimate user (e.g., an order to dispense a drug to a bed
patient for immediate administration in a hospital is not a prescription).” Id. (emphasis removed).
195
The important distinction between administration and prescription has been obscured in
drug policy discourse. As Rufus King explains,
There is a much-neglected distinction between prescription of narcotics to
an addict for self-administration, and direct administration by the physician. The former is the subject of valid criticism, i.e., it does remove all
restraints on consumption by the addict, and the drugs prescribed may be
resold in the illicit traffic. There is merit in the suggestion, made from time
to time, that all self-administration of narcotics should be made illegal. The
‘official line’ has always ignored this distinction, equating prescription for
self-administration with direct or supervised administration, and attacking
both as ‘ambulatory treatment.
King, supra note 184, at 740 n.23.
196
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must be
issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual
course of his professional practice.”).
197
Id. § 1306.04(c) (“A prescription may not be issued for ‘detoxification treatment’ or
‘maintenance treatment,’ unless the prescription is for a Schedule III, IV, or V narcotic drug
approved by the Food and Drug Administration specifically for use in maintenance or detoxification treatment.”). Nevertheless, dispensing is permitted. See id. § 1306.07(a) (“A practitioner
may administer or dispense directly (but not prescribe) a narcotic drug listed in any schedule
to a narcotic dependent person for the purpose of maintenance or detoxification treatment if
the practitioner meets [qualifying] conditions . . . .”).
198
42 U.S.C. § 290bb–2a (2018).
199
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 8.1–8.2.
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defining maintenance and detoxification treatment.200 Those operating under
this catchall “shall use only those opioid agonist treatment medications that
are approved by the Food and Drug Administration . . . in the treatment of
opioid use disorder,” which under associated regulations only includes
methadone, levomethadyl acetate (LAAM), or buprenorphine.201
The DEA’s regulations provide some exceptions to the requirement
that physicians specifically register to provide FDA-approved narcotics to
treat OUD. In emergency situations where the immediate relief of a person’s
acute withdrawal symptoms is necessary while arrangements for referral to
an OTP for treatment are being made, a physician may administer narcotic
drugs to that person, but only for a maximum of three days.202 In addition to
the “three-day rule,” the DEA also does not
impose any limitations on a physician or authorized hospital
staff to administer or dispense narcotic drugs in a hospital to
maintain or detoxify a person as an incidental adjunct to
medical or surgical treatment of conditions other than addiction, or to administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons
with intractable pain in which no relief or cure is possible or
none has been found after reasonable efforts.203
The DEA and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA) have unequivocally stated that restrictions related to
maintenance and detoxification therapy do not apply to opioid therapy for
pain.204 Despite considerable discussion of opioid overprescribing, the closest
200

Id. § 8.2.
Id. § 8.12(h)(2).
202
21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b). For a description of the limited circumstances in which a practitioner
who is unregistered as a narcotic treatment program may treat OUD in those experiencing
acute withdrawal symptoms for up to 72 hours while arranging to refer the patient to an OTP,
see Emergency Narcotic Addiction Treatment, supra note 190. What is not described is what
happens if referral cannot be arranged within this time period and the patient continues to
experience acute withdrawal symptoms. Id.
203
21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c).
204
See id. (stating that there are no “limitations on a physician or authorized hospital staff to
. . . administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in which no relief
or cure is possible or none has been found after reasonable efforts”); OFFICE OF DIVERSION
CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PHARMACIST’S MANUAL 54 (2004) (“A practitioner may
prescribe methadone or any other narcotic to a narcotic addict for analgesic purposes.”). This
allows treatment of patients with opioids indefinitely, if indicated. See Questions & Answers:
Prescriptions, U.S. DEP’T JUST. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: DIVERSION CONTROL DIVISION,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/prescriptions.htm [https:// perma.cc/H3ZF-TAJC] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019) (“Federal law and regulations do not restrict the prescribing, dispensing,
or administering of any schedule II, III, IV, or V narcotic medication, including methadone, for
the treatment of pain, if such treatment is deemed medically necessary by a registered practitioner
acting in the usual course of professional practice.”).
201
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the federal government has come to regulating pain care “on the books”205 is
the release of guidelines by the CDC in 2016.206 In response to condemnation
from the American Medical Association’s House of Delegates in 2018,207 the
CDC underscored that the guidelines are recommendations, and not a mandate,
and more recent efforts have focused on remedying policies and practices that
have resulted from its misapplication.208 There have also been some adjustments
to Medicare,209 and Congress previously granted the FDA authority to regulate
post-marketing activity by drug manufacturers.210 But even as the opioid crisis
205
As we note below in Part IV, investigations and prosecutions are also ways to regulate
prescriptions. Those tools have been used with increasing breadth and intensity, with detrimental
results. DOT-P is sensitive to such enforcement underscoring the importance of resisting
knee-jerk supply-side responses, especially given their potential to perpetuate or increase
opioid-related harms.
206
The guidelines urge practitioners to avoid opioid dosing above 50 morphine milligram
equivalents (MME) per day and to complete risk and benefit reviews. Deborah Dowell et al.,
CDC Guidelines for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 65
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1, 22 (2016). For patients maintained on doses above
90 MME, doctors were told to conduct and document risk and benefit reviews. Id.
207
The resolution read in part:
[N]o entity should use MME (morphine milligram equivalents) thresholds as anything more than guidance, and physicians should not be subject to professional
discipline, loss of board certification, loss of clinical privileges, criminal prosecution, civil liability, or other penalties or practice limitations solely for prescribing
opioids at a quantitative level above the MME thresholds found in the CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids.
AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES (I-18), REPORT OF REFERENCE COMMITTEE B 1-40
(2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2018-11/i18-refcomm-b-annotated.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L8R2-FVVZ].
208
See Opioid Overdose, Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL, https://
www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/prescribing/faq.html [https://perma.cc/3PRH-TRNC] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (“The Guideline is not a regulation, but rather a set of recommendations.
The recommendations in the Guideline are voluntary, rather than prescriptive standards.”).
209
These adjustments include a mandated system of electronic prescribing for controlled
substances, electronic prior authorization requirements for Part D drugs, a new drug management program or “lock-in program,” for Part D patients, hard safety edits for opioids, and
seven-day limits on initial opioid prescriptions for acute pain under Part D. See generally
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., A PRESCRIBER’S GUIDE TO THE NEW MEDICARE
PART D OPIOID OVERUTILIZATION POLICIES FOR 2019 (2018), https://www.cms.gov/ Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/Down
loads/SE18016.pdf [https://perma.cc/76H7-3G7X]. There will also be a real-time safety edit
at 90 morphine milligram equivalents (MME) per day, which could be triggered when a
beneficiary reaches a cumulative level of 90 MME per day across all their opioid prescriptions.
Id. at 2-3. Patients in hospice care, long-term care facilities, or who are receiving palliative
or end-of-life care, or are being treated for cancer-related pain, will be exempt from these
rules. Id. at 4-5.
210
See, e.g., Marta J. Brooks, Mitigating the Safety Risks of Drugs with a Focus on Opioids:
Are Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies the Answer?, 89 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1673,
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intensified, federal agencies have endeavored not to deter pain care at least in
formal written policy.211
D. A Straight Path with the Law on the Books
Large cities in the United States are grappling with dramatic increases
in public injection drug use. The people engaged in this public injection drug
use represent a very small portion of the overall population of people with OUD.
In Philadelphia, for example, there are an estimated 50,000 people misusing
prescription opioids and an estimated 70,000 people using heroin,212 but
fewer than 2,000 people with a substance use disorder are “street homeless”
at any given time.213 Frontline social and health service providers report that
the needs of this population are extensive, but many are not ready to engage
in maintenance or detoxification treatment. Although medication treatment is
scarce in many parts of the country, in some cities, such as Philadelphia, as
many as a quarter of all inpatient beds are empty.214 To the extent that pain is
1678 (2014) (describing the history of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)
and noting that the FDA approved a REMS program for extended-release and long-action
opioids in 2012 that included new product labeling and required manufacturers to offer opioid training programs for prescribers on a voluntary basis).
211
In light of concerns that the CSA overly burdens access to opiates and other controlled
substances needed in the treatment of pain, federal agencies have reaffirmed their role in
ensuring that anti-diversion efforts do not compromise the provision of medical care. See,
e.g., Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain Notice, 71 Fed. Reg.
52,719, 52,719–20 (Sept. 6, 2006) (“DEA takes just as seriously its obligation to ensure that
there is no interference with the dispensing of controlled substances to the American public
in accordance with the sound medical judgment of their physicians.”). But see infra note 305
and accompanying text noting that in practice the DEA and other law enforcement agencies
have increased investigations and prosecutions of clinicians.
212
MAYOR’S TASK FORCE TO COMBAT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN PHILA., FINAL REPORT &
RECOMMENDATIONS 6, 7 (2017), http://dbhids.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/OTF_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2D58-CG5K].
213
PHILA. OFFICE OF HOMELESS SERVS., ADDITIONAL HOMELESS POPULATIONS SUMMARY
FOR PA-500 - PHILADELPHIA COC (2019), http://philadelphiaofficeofhomelessservices.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Subpopulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKF2-WZ9P] (reporting, from a one night census conducted on January 23, 2019, that 767 people with SUD
stayed in emergency shelters, 159 in transitional shelters, 133 in safe havens, and 608 people
with SUD remained unsheltered).
214
Aubrey Whelan, As Philly Pushes for More Medication-Assisted Drug Treatment, Thousands
of Treatment Slots Are Still Empty, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/health/philadelphia-opioids-medication-assisted-treatment-capacity-overdosecrisis-20190118.html [https://perma.cc/D2SC-DDFE]. This is because of administrative and
logistical barriers, including issues like tobacco smoking bans and bans on cannabis. Brooke
Feldman, Why Philly’s Smoking Ban at Addiction Treatment Centers Will Be Harmful,
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an impediment to stabilizing the lives of people to enable the contemplation
required for behavior change, a locality might implement DOT-P, as we have
described it above.
The federal government might argue that DOT-P is engaged in
addiction maintenance treatment that does not comply with the multiple statutory
and regulatory requirements. Operating outside of these boundaries would
expose DOT-P clinicians to deregistration and criminal prosecution. A clinic
offering DOT-P would be on strong footing arguing that DOT-P is not
maintenance, but simply analgesia.215 If the clinic prevailed on this first level of the
analysis, as we expect it would, the federal government might then offer a more
nebulous declaration that DOT-P does not constitute professional practice.216
At its core, then, this would present an interpretive case. The threshold
question for the analysis is whether there is ambiguity in the relevant statutes and
regulations:217 specifically, whether DOT-P fits within the definition of
maintenance.218 We actually think, in contrast, that it is reasonable to read the
plain language of the CSA and its associated regulations as unambiguously
carving DOT-P out of the definition of maintenance. However, on the chance
that a court differed from our plain language analysis, we also construe
potential ambiguities in the legal text in terms of legislative intent and in light
of principles of statutory interpretation.

FILTER MAG. (Feb. 12, 2019), https://filtermag.org/philadelphia-smoking-ban-addictiontreatment-harm-reduction/ [https://perma.cc/W75X-EATM]; Enos, supra note 27, at 5; Nina
Feldman, Philly Health Officials, Advocates Split on Impact of Smoking Ban at Inpatient Rehabs,
WHYY (June 25, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/philly-health-officials-advocates-split-onimpact-of-smoking-ban-at-inpatient-rehabs/ [https://perma.cc/S6ZM-2Z5E].
215
This is not to say that medical necessity arguments do not make sense conceptually or that
other constitutional arguments are not worth arguing. Some cases hint at a constitutional
right to adequate pain relief. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37
(1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The parties and amici agree that in these States a patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers
to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point
of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.”). However, we find it hard to believe that the
Roberts Court would rely on constitutional principles in addressing a DOT-P challenge, when
interpretive arguments provide a less disruptive way of resolving the dispute.
216
DOT-P does not involve prescribing opioids, so the “legitimate medical practice” standard
does not apply. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
217
Textual ambiguity is a required predicate for engaging in statutory construction using legislative intent. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (“[W]hen the words
of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislator’s intentions. Where the language of
those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”).
218
Of the two definitions, maintenance provides a more challenging hurdle for DOT-P proponents, so we focus on it rather than detoxification.
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The plain language argument in support of DOT-P is simple: the CSA
regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) affirmatively recognize a distinction
between maintenance and primary pain care in the presence of secondary OUD.
Specifically, they include an exception from OTP regulations, which reads:
a physician or authorized hospital staff to administer or dispense
narcotic drugs in a hospital to maintain or detoxify a person as an
incidental adjunct to medical or surgical treatment of conditions
other than addiction, or to administer or dispense narcotic drugs
to persons with intractable pain in which no relief or cure is
possible or none has been found after reasonable efforts.219
A grammatically correct construction of the sentence reduces to a carve-out
from the definitions and therefore the requirements of OTP for “a physician
. . . to administer or dispense narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain
in which no relief or cure is possible or none has been found after reasonable
efforts.”220 A physician providing DOT-P to John could reasonably fit this
definition, if the primary indication for John was documented as pain.221
A factual analysis would show that local healthcare entities spent hundreds of
thousands of dollars treating John through other clinical channels, yet his
pain remained the same. There is no legislative or regulatory discussion of what
constitutes “intractable pain” or “reasonable efforts.”222 But a recent administrative decision makes clear that these determinations are medical ones and must
be based on the standards of medical practice as evaluated by a physician.223
219

21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) (2018).
Id.
221
This is so even in a case where a practitioner treats acute pain in a patient with a chemical
dependency on controlled substances and lowers the dosage over time, in what would appear
to be treatment similar to detoxification. See William F. Skinner, M.D.; Continuation of Registration, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,891, 62,891 (Dec. 7, 1995) (finding that, although the patient was
dependent on the drugs and the respondent was not specially registered as an NTP, the patient
did not fall under the statutory definition of an “addict” and the respondent was “acting in the
usual course of his professional practice” by tapering prescriptions following an acute pain
episode, not performing maintenance or detoxification treatment).
222
See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c).
223
See Morris W. Cochran, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,505, 17,505
(Feb. 1, 2012). In this decision, the administrator disputed an ALJ determination that the
respondent violated 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) because “his charts failed to show the use of any
treatment options besides the prescribing of controlled substances,” and so he had not employed “reasonable efforts” to find relief. Id. at 17,520. Instead, the administrator read the
regulation as requiring “a clinical judgment which must be assessed by reference to the standards
of medical practice as set by the state medical boards and the profession itself.” Id. A failure
to recommend alternative treatments was only “some evidence” of failure to comply with the
regulation when dispensing narcotic drugs without a license to a patient suffering from pain.
Id. While the respondent ultimately had his registration revoked for other violations, this
220
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The government surely would minimize the regulatory language in
the CFR and rely on the more seemingly encompassing language in the CSA
itself. It would probably begin by noting that maintenance treatment is
defined broadly as “the dispensing . . . of a narcotic drug in the treatment of
an individual for dependence upon heroin or other morphine-like drugs”224
and that registrations and other requirements attach to any practitioner who
“dispense[s] narcotic drugs to individuals for maintenance treatment.”225
However, DOT-P provides treatment with a narcotic drug to people with
opioid dependence; it does not provide that treatment for opioid dependence.226 Given that the DEA and SAMHSA note that the treatment with opioids
for pain and for OUD are distinguishable clinically and legally,227 the choice of
for rather than with should be read as deliberate and understood as limiting.228
The DEA might also argue that the other exception in § 1306.07(b)
contemplates and therefore restricts treatment for people with co-occurring
pain and OUD. The “three-day rule” allows immediate relief of acute withdrawal
symptoms to bridge the gap to an OTP treatment for someone in a hospital.229
But treatment of withdrawal is not the primary or even necessarily a secondary
aim of DOT-P; few DOT-P participants need help preventing withdrawal
given the ubiquity of street opioids, which contrasts with someone experiencing
withdrawal inside of a hospital.
The legislative history and appellate record related to section
1306.07(b) are sparse. There are only oblique references to the “three-day
portion of the order underscores how the legitimate practice of medicine prevails when
treating pain with narcotic drugs. Id. at 17522.
224
21 U.S.C. § 802(29) (2018) (emphasis added).
225
Id. § 823(g) (emphasis added).
226
Dependence is not defined in any statute or regulation. Dependence is defined as “a state
in which an organism functions normally only in the presence of a drug.” Definition of Dependence, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications /teachingpackets/neurobiology-drug-addiction/section-iii-action-heroin-morphine/8-definition-dependence [https://perma.cc/7X5W-TLA5] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). It “manifest[s] as
physical disturbances when the drug is removed.” Id.
227
See supra note 204 and accompanying text194.
228
See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1986) (supporting the
lower court’s contention that, if the defendant “prescribed the drugs in good faith for legitimate
medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice and did not prescribe them for
drug maintenance or addiction he is not guilty,” and obliquely supporting a finding of ‘not
guilty’ in an instance where “a patient was an addict and the doctor treated his addiction with
Sched[ule] II drugs, and the patient experienced chronic pain, and the doctor treated the
chronic pain in a good faith effort”).
229
See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07(b) (allowing physicians to administer “narcotic drugs to a person
for the purpose of relieving acute withdrawal symptoms when necessary while arrangements
are being made for referral for treatment . . . . Such emergency treatment may be carried out
for not more than three days and may not be renewed or extended”); see also Emergency
Narcotic Addiction Treatment, supra note 190.
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rule” in judicial examinations of other subparts.230 There is no discussion of
the rule in the preambles of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) or
the Final Rule.231 The DEA has forcefully stated that “[t]he 72-hour exception
offers an opioid dependent individual relief from experiencing acute withdrawal
symptoms, while the physician arranges placement in a maintenance/
detoxification treatment program. This provision was established to augment,
not to circumvent the separate registration requirement.”232 But this simply
reflects the interest of the DEA in preserving registration requirements for
maintenance therapy.233 If DOT-P is not maintenance therapy, the three-day
rule is inapposite.
230

See, e.g., United States v. Ilayayev, 800 F. Supp. 2d 417, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 21
C.F.R. § 1306.07(c) as an example of an exception to the limitations on prescribing opioids
as part of a long discussion of the opioid crisis in the United States while ultimately upholding the defendant’s revoked supervised release and new sentence); United States v. Witt,
1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14387, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing an older version of the regulation to
uphold a pharmacist’s indictment for “willfully and knowingly” prescribing and dispensing
scheduled drugs “without legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional
practice” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cap Quality Care, Inc., 486 F.
Supp. 2d 47, 50 n.3 (Me. 2007) (dispensing with 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 as only indirectly supporting
the fact that “prescriptions for methadone are illegal” in maintenance or detoxification treatment,
instead finding that 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(c) better supports that proposition).
231
See 39 Fed. Reg. 37,983, 37,983 (Oct. 25, 1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,424, 26,424 (July 19,
1974). The legislative history and congressional records, too, were silent on subpart (b),
which makes sense, since the DEA promulgated the rule four years after the CSA was
passed giving relatively broad authority to the DEA to do what it pleased, and nothing in the
authorizing statute makes any mention of any of these rules’ substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 821
(2018) (giving the Attorney General the authority to “promulgate rules and regulations . . .
relating to the registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of
controlled substances and to listed chemicals.”).
232
Emergency Narcotic Addiction Treatment, supra note 190.
233
See Randall L. Wolff, M.D.; Decision and Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5106 (Feb. 1, 2012)
(finding that the “three-day rule” exception for non-registered physicians did not permit the
prescribing of opioids, even to allay acute withdrawal symptoms, for an undefined period of
time and concluding that the physician had not prescribed the controlled substances with a
legitimate medical purpose and that the revocation of his registration to dispense controlled
substances was in the public interest). There exists some case law in the states indicating that
violating the DEA’s registration requirement for OTPs does not show negligence per se, and
so good faith treatment beyond the “three-day rule” might end up going to a jury to decide
whether a practitioner was negligent. See, e.g., Friedel v. Osunkoya, 994 A.2d 746, 756 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2010) (finding that violating the DEA’s registration requirement for OTPs is not
a basis to find negligence per se). Nevertheless, a jury trial and revocation of registration is
a risk few practitioners would be willing to assume. See generally Beth Jung & Marcus M.
Reidenberg, The Risk of Action by the Drug Enforcement Administration Against Physicians
Prescribing Opioids for Pain, 7 PAIN MED. 353 (2006) (describing the fear physicians feel
about losing their registrations for prescribing opioids for pain, although finding that, generally,
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If a court disagreed with our plain language analysis of § 1306.07(c),
it would approach the question about the definition of maintenance therapy
as one of statutory ambiguity. That analysis would begin with an examination
of legislative intent. The place to start would be the House and Senate discussion
of the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act (NATA) of 1974, which defined
maintenance and detoxification treatment and added HHS oversight to
narcotics treatment.234 As both reports indicate, the CSA additions in NATA
primarily aimed to prevent diversion of controlled substances into illicit
channels, which is impossible with DOT-P because opioids are directly
administered in the clinic.
The Senate report began by declaring that the bill aimed to help “law
enforcement agencies . . . investigate and to curb the diversion and abuse of
narcotic drugs used in the treatment of narcotic addicts.”235 Specifically, and
notably, the amendment targeted the “increased opportunity for diversion
of methadone into the illicit market” caused by the expansion of methadone programs after the CSA’s passage three years prior.236 In drafting the
bill, the Senate weighed the traditional powers the states had to regulate “the
general practice of medicine” against “the specialized circumstances within
the purview of the bill [specifically opioid treatment], which entail inordinate
risks of diversion and unethical profiteering.”237 The Senate report concludes
by stating that the CSA amendments “will reaffirm the commitment Congress
the risk of an action by the DEA is low for physicians with adequate documentation in the
medical record).
234
See Narcotic Addict Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-281 §§ 2-3, 88 Stat. 124, 124-125
(1974).
235
S. REP NO. 93-192, at 2 (1973).
236
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
237
Id. at 13 (emphasis added). In the end, the Senate placed power in what is now the HHS to
“approv[e] . . . treatment standards” based on its authority “to determine standards of treatment
in this area.” Id. at 3, 12. This statement speaks to the fact that maintenance was, at that
point, delivered exclusively through research exemptions, which was unsustainable. Until the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974 was passed, maintenance treatment was
considered a “research endeavor[].” Id. at 11. Programs proliferated well beyond the
scope that had been anticipated, leading to the necessity of classifying them as defined
treatment programs. See id. at 11-12 (finding that “[m]ethadone maintenance programs
were first initiated as research endeavors” and that these criteria were “never intended
to apply to the massive treatment efforts now in progress nor the proposed expanded
approval of methadone to the status of a new drug which permits the use of methadone
for the maintenance treatment of narcotic addiction for all addicts for whom it is medically justified”). This is in contrast to detoxification programs, which were already established and well recognized, and therefore—prior to this amendment—could not be
regulated in a manner outside of any other general medical practice. See H.R. REP NO.
93-884, at 9 (1974) (“[T]he Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has required a
separate registration of all maintenance programs but has lacked authority to require this
of detoxification programs.”).
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made to the nation when it passed the [CSA] by . . . facilitating the prosecution of those who engage in the criminal distribution of legitimate narcotic
drugs for profit.”238
The House report similarly describes the Act as necessary to address
diversion related to the massive expansion of methadone treatment programs.239
It declares that the “bill is designed to permit flexibility in treatment, while
requiring adequate accountability for narcotic drugs administered in that
treatment,” and it places emphasis on “the increased regulation of methadone and other narcotic drugs used in the treatment of narcotic addicts.”240
The way that representatives sought to accomplish both goals is illustrated
in the report’s pronouncement that “[t]he intent of the bill is twofold: (1) to
increase the DEA's ability to deal with law enforcement aspects of diversion;
and (2) to maintain jurisdiction within FDA over the medical, scientific, and
public health aspects of narcotic addiction treatment.”241 This second stated
intention—to maintain FDA’s jurisdiction over medical practice in opioid
treatment—specifically reflects the drafters’ reaction to FDA’s inability to
regulate detoxification treatment, despite its similarities to maintenance
treatment and the attendant potential for diversion.242
Given the textual and legislative intent arguments available, we
think that DOT-P would be on solid legal footing facing a challenge from
federal law enforcement: neither the plain language nor the legislative history
suggests that treatment of pain with secondary OUD must conform with
maintenance or any other requirements beyond the generally prevailing
obligation of professional practice. But it is also important to note that even
if federal lawyers could introduce more ambiguity into the analysis, the legal
principles for addressing that ambiguity militate in favor of DOT-P. In
particular, three constitutional issues inflect the construction of the statutes
and regulations in ways that support DOT-P proponents: the presumption
against preemption, the rule of lenity, and the plausible right to pain care.
238

S. REP NO. 93-192, at 15 (emphasis added).
See H.R. REP NO. 93-884, at 1 (claiming that as narcotics treatment programs have
expanded, methadone diversion from these programs has increased).
240
Id. at 4.
241
Id.
242
The House Report explained that
the joint DEA-FDA regulatory efforts did bring about some improvement in the quality of methadone maintenance programs, did result in
the closing of some of the worst programs, and did lay the groundwork
for further legal developments, but regrettably left many problems unsolved, particularly with respect to diversion of methadone used for
detoxification.
Id. at 3.
239
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The Court’s preference for avoiding far-reaching constitutional rulings
suggests that any one or all three provide a basis for steering the interpretation of maintenance towards a more limited construction.243
The Court has established that in areas of traditional state concern—
of which regulation of medical practice is a classic example244—there exists
a presumption against preemption.245 The Court requires that, “when choice
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require
243

What had once been called a “cardinal principle” of judicial restraint, the avoidance doctrine is the principle that, if faced with a statute whose interpretation raises a constitutional
issue, a court should determine “whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.” See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
In recent years, the Supreme Court has weaponized the avoidance doctrine, relying on
“active avoidance” to develop new constitutional law principles and to rewrite statutes
beyond how they might “more naturally” be read. See e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (“[I]t is only because we have a duty to construe
a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that § 5000A can be interpreted as a tax.”); see also
Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court
and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2019) (discussing how the modern shift
in the constitutional avoidance doctrine under the Roberts Court “leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little resemblance to laws actually passed by the elected branches”
through “sloppy and cursory constitutional reasoning”). Nevertheless, courts continue to rely
on the doctrine generally. Tangentially, in an interesting parallel, NFIB used a maneuver
similar to that employed in the early Harrison Narcotic Drug Act cases discussed supra by
construing the federal government’s taxing powers to extend beyond their rational limits.
Compare NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574 (“[I]t is only because we have a duty to construe a statute
to save it, if fairly possible, that §5000A [a provision of the ACA] can be interpreted as a
tax.”), with United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 95 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality of the Harrison Act as a revenue measure—before the DEA, narcotics enforcement was
administered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue—because the defendant’s patient
was prescribed more narcotic doses than he would likely use and “[h]e might sell some to
others without paying the [Harrison Act’s] tax,” thus frustrating the overall goal of the Act,
“facilitating the collection of the revenue”).
244
The Court has emphasized that
There can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of its
police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of
dangerous and habit-forming drugs . . . . The right to exercise this power
is so manifest in the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is
unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too
firmly established to be successfully called in question.
Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
245
According to the Supremacy Clause, the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, federal regulations, and ratified treaties trump the laws of the states when a direct conflict exists. U.S.
CONST. art. VI. However, there is a presumption against federal preemption when it comes
to the exercise of “historic police powers of the States.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”246
This presumption exists also in administrative and civil cases, as the Court
“ha[s] never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation, but
instead ha[s] addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”247
Constitutional principles also require criminal statutes to clearly
define proscribed activity.248 Without such clarity, criminal laws are considered
impermissibly vague for failing to warn citizens of potential sanctions and
for inviting arbitrary enforcement.249 This suggests that a court facing two
plausible interpretations should shy away from the one involving prosecution
of a practitioner acting with a reasonable claim to legality.250 It also means
246

United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
N.Y. State Conf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
654-55 (1995) (quoting Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230); see also JAMES T.
O’REILLY, AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW:
LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND LITIGATION 7 (2006) (“If the subject matter was ‘traditionally
regarded as properly within the scope of state superintendence,’ or a matter of public
health or safety, then the courts rely more heavily on the presumption that states will
continue to have an important role.”).
248
As the Connally Court explained:
The terms of a penal statute . . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties . . . [A]nd a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
249
This is sometimes referred to as the Rule of Lenity. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (“If a statute or ordinance is so indefinite that ‘it
encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ it will be void for vagueness.”);
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (holding that, where the statute is
silent and legislative history absent on a particular issue, “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity”); United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute
that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute’ is void for vagueness.”).
250
See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (“[W]e adhere to the
time-honored interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83
(1955) (“When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.”). But see Intisar
A. Rabb, Response, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REF. F. 179, 198-99
(2018) (finding that “the Roberts Court rejected lenity in favor of broad constructions in
31 of its 44 lenity-eligible cases . . . . In the vast majority of these cases (all but 6), the
Court asserted that its readings were dictated by the texts’ ‘plain meaning[s]’ . . . despite
247
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that the prosecution would have to prove that the clinician knowingly or
intentionally administered a prohibited narcotic outside the usual course
of professional practice. Establishing the requisite intent—or mens rea—has
proven difficult in misprescribing prosecutions.251 Courts have generally
allowed evidence of good faith in such cases.252 Because these cases exclusively
involve prescribing—as opposed to administration—usually with minimal
or no medical evaluation, such good faith arguments are substantially
weaker than a clinician providing DOT-P could offer.
The difficulty and uncertainty in the diagnosis and treatment of
pain complicates identifying the requisite mens rea. Determining whether pain
or OUD is the primary indication or whether addressing one is contingent on
addressing the other relies on individualized assessments that cannot be reduced
to bright lines and biologic indicators. Courts have been reluctant to impose
criminal sanctions when guilt hinges on physicians making impossible clinical
judgments—such as identifying the moment viability occurs in abortion-related

concurrences or dissents raising alternative plausible meanings and sometimes arguing
for lenity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
251
As the Ninth Circuit explained,
a practitioner who acts outside the usual course of professional practice may
be convicted under § 841(a) only if he does so intentionally. . . .
Simply put, to convict a practitioner under § 841(a), the government
must prove . . . that the practitioner acted with intent to distribute the
drugs and with intent to distribute them outside the course of professional
practice. In other words, the jury must make a finding of intent not
merely with respect to distribution, but also with respect to the doctor’s
intent to act as a pusher rather than a medical professional.
United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2006).
252
See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 476 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that
“a doctor’s good faith generally is relevant to a jury’s determination of whether the
doctor acted outside the bounds of medical practice or with a legitimate medical purpose
when prescribing narcotics,” although still sentencing the defendant to nearly five
years in prison); see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break The Law, 53 S T .
LOUIS U. L.J. 1049, 1072 (2009) (noting that “the legal system has responded much
more discriminately, even compassionately in a number of cases where physicians
appear to be acting to help their patients . . . when the law is in flux or when there is
considerable societal ambivalence about a law,” as is the case with OUD).
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litigation253—which constitute little more than “a trap for those who act in
good faith.”254
Interpretive arguments would also unfold in the shadow of a plausible
right to pain care. Although a majority of the Court has never acknowledged
such a right in a single joint opinion, multiple legal scholars have observed
that reading across plurality decisions, and some of the Justices have signaled
that treatment for severe pain is a fundamental right.255 Justice O’Connor
once remarked that “[t]here is no dispute that dying patients in Washington
253

In the context of abortion, the Court stated,
The perils of strict criminal liability are particularly acute here because of
the uncertainty of the viability determination itself. As the record in this
case indicates, a physician determines whether or not a fetus is viable after
considering a number of variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived
from the reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based on
an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus; the woman's
general health and nutrition; the quality of the available medical facilities;
and other factors. Because of the number and the imprecision of these
variables, the probability of any particular fetus’ obtaining meaningful life
outside the womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the
record indicates that even if agreement may be reached on the probability
of survival, different physicians equate viability with different probabilities of
survival, and some physicians refuse to equate viability with any numerical
probability at all. In the face of these uncertainties, it is not unlikely that
experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in the second trimester
has advanced to the stage of viability. The prospect of such disagreement,
in conjunction with a statute imposing strict civil and criminal liability for
an erroneous determination of viability, could have a profound chilling
effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point
of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical judgment.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395-96 (1979).
254
United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); see also Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395
(“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”).
255
Burt explained,
the Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that there is no constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. Unexpectedly, however, the Court did
much more than simply uphold the New York and Washington statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide. A Court majority effectively required all
states to ensure that their laws do not obstruct the provision of adequate
palliative care, especially for the alleviation of pain and other physical
symptoms of people facing death.
Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right
to Palliative Care, 337 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234 (1997); see Beth Packman Weinman,
Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEG. MED. 495,
525-29 (2003) (analyzing different Justices’ concurring opinions in physician-assisted suicide
cases and concluding that many of the opinions indicate that up to five of the Justices
on the bench in 2003 “recognize[d] the right to pain relief as fundamental”).
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and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten
their deaths.”256 It would be strange, indeed, if the Supreme Court effectively
upheld a program that hastened death with opioids, over federal claims about
the legitimacy of the practice (e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon), but not a program
preventing death with opioids, over similar federal objections. Just as the
Court avoided weighty constitutional issues about federalism and the right to die
by disposing of the Oregon case on interpretive grounds, it might similarly avoid
an interpretation that forced a decision on the right to pain care.
If, as we suspect, the federal government challenged DOT-P and lost
the argument that DOT-P is maintenance, it might follow up by suggesting
that DOT-P falls beyond the bounds of professional practice.257 This would
be a difficult argument. Considerable evidence and experience support the
primary treatment modality of DOT-P.258 The definition of what constitutes
professional practice encompasses all good faith activity between patients
and providers.259 In the words of a former DEA Legal Counsel, in a description
of the agency’s efforts to prosecute clinicians for violations of the CSA,
[a]cts of prescribing or dispensing of controlled substances
which are done within the course of the registrant’s professional practice are, for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, lawful. It matters not that such acts might constitute terrible medicine or malpractice. They may reflect
256

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-37 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
A practitioner’s liability for possibly violating the CSA in the case of DOT-P hinges on
three statutory requirements: 1) a practitioner must knowingly or intentionally 2) dispense
(including administer) a controlled substance 3) in the course of professional practice. 21
U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018). Section 829(a) states that, for Schedule II substances, a practitioner
(other than a pharmacist) directly dispensing the controlled substance to an ultimate user
does not need a prescription. Id. § 829(a). The definition of a practitioner in the CSA specifies
that this dispensing must be “in the course of professional practice or research.” Id. § 802(21).
Only later, once the DEA promulgated its regulations following the CSA’s passage, was an
additional requirement that the practitioner must prescribe with “a legitimate medical
purpose . . . in the usual course of his professional practice” added. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)
(2018). Statutorily and regulatory-wise, the legitimate medical purpose requirement, therefore, only applies to prescribing, and not to a practitioner dispensing directly to an ultimate
user, as would be the case with DOT-P. The distinction here is important to note, as a physician administering hydromorphone would only be subject to the ‘in the course of professional
practice’ requirement.
258
Based both on the existence of similar practices internationally and the research studies
discussed in supra note 90.
259
See Katherine Goodman, Prosecution of Physicians as Drug Traffickers: The United States’
Failed Protection of Legitimate Opioid Prescription Under the Controlled Substances Act and
South Australia's Alternative Regulatory Approach, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 210, 230
(2008) (“The professional practice requirement of the good faith defense . . . helps to
ensure that physicians only prescribe controlled substances in the course of medical
treatment.”).
257
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the grossest form of medical misconduct or negligence.
They are nevertheless legal.260
The DEA itself, in its most current Practitioner’s Manual, acknowledges
that “[f]ederal courts have long recognized that it is not possible to expand
on the phrase ‘legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional
practice’ in a way that will provide definitive guidelines to address all the
varied situations physicians may encounter.”261 Clinicians act outside of
their professional practice only when their activities aim not at addressing
a diagnosed medical complaint but at some other purpose like profit.262
Undercover agents pursuing overprescribing physicians, the DEA Counsel
notes, “should present themselves as persons seeking drugs and should
never give a legitimate medical complaint.”263
Few cases have explored either the professional practice or legitimate
medical practice standard.264 Some courts do not draw a distinction between

260
Stephen E. Stone, The Investigation and Prosecution of Professional Practice Cases
Under the Controlled Substances Act, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 21, 23 (1983).
261
OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., PRACTITIONER’S
MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 30 (2006),
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract_manual012508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZYS-TUX6].
262
According to Stone,
While every practitioner case is different, most lend themselves to an
undercover approach in which agent, posing as a typical client, attempts to
obtain drugs or prescriptions under circumstances showing lack of a
physician-patient relationship. In order for a practitioner to prescribe
or dispense in the course of his professional practice, there must exist
between the doctor and the ‘patient’ a valid physician-patient relationship. To
establish this relationship, the patient must come to the physician seeking treatment for some kind of physical or psychological condition or symptomology.
The physician must then obtain from the patient enough of a medical history
. . . [and] conduct an examination or other medically recognized procedure sufficient to make a diagnosis. Finally, there must be a logical
connection, or nexus, between the drug ultimately prescribed and the
physical or psychological condition diagnosed. Patients of violative
physicians typically do not present medical complaints.
Stone, supra note 260, at 24.
263
Id.
264
It is worth noting that all of the following cases involve prescribing, not administering, but
their opinions refer to dispensing generally, and so might represent the applicable caselaw in instances of administering, as well.
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the two;265 others refer to both but do not evaluate them separately.266 In
Moore, the Supreme Court appears to define professional practice based
simply on whether the defendant procedurally acted like a physician, focusing
on the fact that “he gave inadequate physical examinations or none at all[,] .
. . [h]e did not give methadone at the clinic[,] . . . [h]e did not regulate the
dosage at all, prescribing as much and as frequently as the patient demanded[,] .
. . [and h]e did not charge for medical services rendered, but graduated his
fee according to the number of tablets desired.”267 No self-respecting federal
official would suggest that DOT-P fails the Moore test.268
IV. PRECISION IN OPIOID POLICY—NOT PENDULUM SWINGS—
IS KEY TO REDUCING OVERDOSE
As this Article goes to print, federal law enforcement officials are
appealing a decision in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruling that a

265

See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 197 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that
“[t]he two phrases [from 21 U.S.C. § 802(20) and 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)(1974)] in the
indictment have essentially the same meaning” for purposes of the defendant’s indictment, and relying on a “good faith” standard to determine whether the defendant was
acting in the course of professional practice).
266
See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082, 1103-04 (11th Cir. 2013) (relying
on testimony regarding medical standards to support a finding that there was enough
evidence to support the lower court’s sentencing, but incompletely matching that evidence to legitimate medical purpose and the usual course of professional practice, instead ruling on a more general “applicable standard of practice” that appears to subsume
both terms); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing
that there is a difference between the two terms and their provenance, but still supplying
no language to differentiate their legal applicability); United States v. Guerrero, 650
F.2d 728, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing defendant’s convictions in the lower court
because of erroneously admitted evidence pertaining to defendant’s conduct and going
back and forth between the two terms when evaluating the evidence and combining them
in interesting ways, such as “normal medical purposes” and “normal course of a medical
practice,” but never distinguishing between any of the terms’ incarnations).
267
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 142-43 (1975).
268
In the Safehouse case, Judge McHugh observed that the government’s counsel
derided [Safehouse's description of the program] as ‘Bizarro World,’ urged
the Court to ‘be real,’ and seemingly rejected any therapeutic purpose, stating, ‘They’re not inviting people onto their property just to get treatment or
whatever other services they’re offering. The whole purpose here is for people to use drugs.’ My inclination is to discount these remarks as a moment
of overly zealous advocacy. But in any case, no plausible reading of the
pleadings before me supports such a caricature of what Safehouse proposes.
United States v. Safehouse, No. 19-0519, 2019 WL 4858266, at *24 n.46 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2,
2019) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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planned SCF in Philadelphia does not violate a section of the CSA.269 Philadelphia has the highest rate of fatal overdoses in the country among large cities.270
The proposed SCF would help bring that rate down while addressing other
individual and community harms associated with widespread injection drug use
in public in one particular neighborhood.
It is a momentous decision. But as the case moves through the courts
and clears other procedural hurdles, people will continue to experience avoidable
harm including death. When the stakes are so high, in terms of immediate and
preventable harm, any delay is horrific. In this Article, we introduce a new
intensive pain care model to engage an especially vulnerable subset of people
who inject drugs, namely those experiencing serious and otherwise unmanaged
pain. This model is essential for addressing substantial avoidable harm
including death and it is plainly within the bounds of professional practice.
But we cannot deny that a case involving DOT-P might encounter legal roadblocks given the grand tradition of drug policy (“drugs bad; prosecution
good”271) and the DEA’s recent surge in investigations and prosecutions.
Law enforcement action against DOT-P would be especially ironic
and misguided. There are valid reasons to be concerned about overprescribing,
especially in the pill mill incarnation of the problem, which the DEA miserably
failed to identify and disrupt.272 Preventing diversion and overdose among
people prescribed opioids also remain legitimate and challenging public
health priorities. However, the DOT-P model we propose—a highly structured
dispensing and consumption environment designed to maximize benefits,
while minimizing the risks—responds to these concerns and challenges with
269
See id. at *11-12 (holding that the “Crack House” statute in the CSA is capable of
multiple interpretations and that because Congress did not contemplate SCFs when creating or revising the provision, it does not apply against at SCF); Jeremy Roebuck &
Aubrey Whelan, Judge: Philly Supervised Injection Site Proposal Does Not Violate Federal Law, PHILA . INQUIRER (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/health/opioid-addiction/safehouse-supervised-injection-site-ruling-philadelphia-mchugh-opioids-20191002.
html [https://perma.cc/AN27-GGF8] (“Justice Department officials, who had asked the
judge to declare the supervised injection plan illegal, vowed an immediate appeal.”).
270
See Alexis M. Roth et al., Overdose Prevention Site Acceptability Among Residents
and Businesses Surrounding a Proposed Site in Philadelphia, USA, 96 J. URBAN HEALTH
341, 341-42 (2019) (stating that the more than 1074 overdose deaths involving opioids
in 2017 constituted a rate of 69.5 per 100,000, higher than in other U.S. cities).
271
Burris et al., supra note 10, at 1123.
272
See, e.g., Leo Beletsky & Jeremiah Goulka, The Federal Agency That Fuels the
Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/
opinion/drugs-dea-defund-heroin.html [https://perma.cc/M5Q3-VHJW] (describing the
DEA’s poor design for not being informed by public health or addiction science, and
thus focusing on eradicating illicit drugs and being “unable to balance legitimate access
to and control of prescription drugs.”).
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precision. For this and other reasons, we expect the DOT-P approach and
others like SCFs to triumph in a saner drug policy in the not so distant future.
Our optimism is grounded not just on the hint of daylight provided by the
Safehouse decision but also in converging epidemiological, political, public
health, and legal dynamics.
In 2016, as the opioid crisis in the United States worsened, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA).273 It was
the first time in four decades that Congress adopted major drug policy
legislation underscoring the gravity of increasing opioid-related harms.
Nevertheless, CARA only chipped at the edges of the crisis.274 At the tail
end of 2018, when it became clear that CARA was inadequate to reverse
the opioid epidemic’s toll, Congress passed the SUPPORT for Patients and
Communities Act.275 But it, too, operated on the periphery of the crisis.276
The policy response at the federal and state level has followed a longterm pattern in search of pharmacological counter-measures. Federal officials
have accurately acknowledged limitations in existing treatment modalities.
Former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb recognized that, although current
OUD treatments do improve outcomes, “relapse rates are still high” and
“not all patients respond positively to such medications.”277 But the FDA
273

Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L No. 114-98, 130 Stat. 695 (2016).
It expanded the number of patients who could be treated. Id. § 303. It also sought to
improve information and training campaigns. Id. §§ 102, 202. At the same time, it made
millions of dollars in grants available to states and medical facilities to expand access to
methadone and buprenorphine. Id. § 201.
275
Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment
for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271 (2018).
276
Among other small improvements, it focused on encouraging drug manufacturers and
distributors to report and stop suspicious orders and expanded treatment programs concentrating on opioid diversion and OUD in specific populations, such as mothers and
infants. Id. §§ 3272, 7061.
277
Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb,
M.D., on New Steps to Encourage More Widespread Innovation and Development of New
Treatments for Opioid Use Disorder (April 20, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-steps-encouragemore-widespread-innovation-and [https://perma.cc/EQ92-MGTM]. Indeed, he continued to
“welcome” the development of new treatments for OUD and indicated that “such therapies
may qualify for the agency’s expedited review programs.” Id. The FDA and the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) have highlighted the barriers to new MAT drug development. Nora D. Volkow et al., Medication Development in Opioid Addiction: Meaningful
Clinical End Points, 10 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., no. 434, at 1, 1 (noting that “developing
new medications to reduce the burden caused by opioid-use disorders is a high priority”).
The FDA also released draft guidance with an expanded list of endpoints to demonstrate the
effectiveness of a drug for use in MAT. U.S. FOOD & DRUG AD-MIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: OPIOID USE DISORDER: ENDPOINTS FOR DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVENESS OF
DRUGS FOR MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/114948/
download [https://perma.cc/6SN5-Q6GB].
274
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has not approved a new medication treatment for maintenance and detoxification since 2002,278 in part because the drug approval process is tedious, costly,
and time-consuming.279
Improvements in access to methadone and buprenorphine are lifesaving
for many people, but not all, or at least not without adequate pain control.
Herein lies a key impediment to sensible reform but also an important practical
opportunity: opioid use, opioid dependence, and opioid use disorder are not
monolithic. They differ in their causes and in their clinical presentation.280
278
Letter from Cynthia G. McCormick, Dir., Div. of Anesthetic, Critical Care, and Addiction
Drug Products, Office of Drug Evaluation II, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., to Alan N. Young, Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Reckitt Benckiser (Oct.
8, 2002), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2002/20732 20733ltr.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ ZR4J-4XS3] (“These new drug applications provide for the use of
Subutex and Suboxone for the treatment of opioid dependence in patients 16 years of age
and older.”). All MAT drugs have been specifically approved for this purpose through the
FDA’s prescribed new drug application (NDA) process. See id.; Determination That
ORLAAM (Levomethadyl Acetate Hydrochloride) Oral Solution, 10 Milligrams/Milliliter,
Was Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,366,
32,366 (June 6, 2011) (discussing the discontinuation of ORLAAM, but recognizing that it
was submitted for approval via NDA for the management of opioid dependence and was
approved in 1993); Approved New Drugs Requiring Continuation of Long-Term Studies,
Records, and Reports; listing of Methadone With Special Requirements for Use, 37 Fed.
Reg. 26,790, 26,795 (Dec. 15, 1972) (revising prior regulations and listing methadone as a
drug subject to NDA approval). While the FDA has in recent years approved new forms and
delivery mechanisms for MAT drugs, those have also gone through the NDA process. See,
e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR SUBLOCADE (2017), https://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2017/209819Orig1s000Approv.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WP5G-WU97] (approving a new extended release form of buprenorphine for use
in OTP). In fact, the FDA’s most recent draft guidance document encouraging the development of buprenorphine depot products solicits applications through the expedited NDA process. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: OPIOID USE DISORDER:
DEVELOPING DEPOT BUPRENORPHINE PRODUCTS FOR TREATMENT (2018), https://www.fda.
gov/media/ 112739/download [https:// perma.cc/EHG2-SL4F]. However, this draft guidance
document also hedges, stating that using the expedited 505(b)(2) NDA submission pathway
“may be appropriate” for this form of buprenorphine. Id. at 1.
279
See Cassandra L. Santoro, Overdosing on Authority: Negative Side Effects of the FDA's
Proposal for Generic Label Changes May Include Increased Costs and Liabilities, 49
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 183, 185-88 & n.41 (2016) (stating that “[t]he process for filing a new
drug application is cumbersome and extensive” and noting that, over the course of a decade,
“brand-name drug manufacturers invested over $500 billion in research and development for
[300 approved] new drugs.”). The FDA itself has indicated in multiple statements and papers
that it is seeking more, and better, drugs for use in MAT. See supra note 277. Nevertheless,
even in its solicitations for a specific MAT drug that it intends to approve, it requires that the
developer go through the NDA process, albeit on an expedited timetable. See id.
280
Opioid Use Disorder (OUD) is defined as opioid use leading to a clinically significant impairment or distress, as indicated by two or more of ten possible symptoms. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
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The people likely to benefit from DOT-P represent a concentrated subset of
people who experience OUD along with co-occurring pain and housing
instability. Better access to OUD pharmacotherapy alone will not fully
address their needs, especially considering the limited models for providing
OAT in the United States. And to the extent that their needs are not met,
communities will continue to experience the effects of public injection drug
use, which are largely preventable.
Federal officials have celebrated—sometimes cautiously and
sometimes not281—that the epidemic has crested in part through federal
initiatives.282 But the evidence on the ground is far more complex. Public
drug use is widely prevalent in many urban areas, producing infections and
community effects.283 An outbreak of hepatitis A in Philadelphia284 underscores
the challenges in reducing the incidence and harms of public injection drug
use. The only way to break the cycles that perpetuate public injection is
through interventions like DOT-P, and, to a lesser extent, SCFs. Although
some of the most affected neighborhoods have opposed SCFs in the United
States, that opposition is grounded in mistaken beliefs that SCFs will promote
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-5) § 2.17.22 (5th ed.
2013) (ebook). Of the 256 possible combinations of opioid-related symptoms that meet
the diagnostic criteria, some are exclusively physiological, and others are exclusively social. Id.
OUD severity is mild when there are 2 or 3 of these symptoms, mild when there are 4 or 5 of
these symptoms, and severe when there are 6 or more of these symptoms. Id.
281
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Secretary Azar Statement on 2018 Provisional Drug Overdose Death Data (July 17, 2019), https://www.hhs.
gov/about/news/2019/07/17.html [https://perma.cc/DQG6-TU56] (“While the declining
trend of overdose deaths is an encouraging sign, by no means have we declared victory
against the epidemic or addiction in general. This crisis developed over two decades and it
will not be solved overnight.”); Donald Trump, Remarks in a Meeting on Opioids (June 12,
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/4BA6-JHRV] (“And I think what we do—this is a meeting on
opioid [sic] and the tremendous effect that’s taken place over the last little period of time.
And I’m very proud of it and the people working so hard on it.”).
282
See Abby Goodnough, Josh Katz & Margot Sanger-Katz, Drug Overdose Deaths Drop in
U.S. for First Time Since 1990, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2019/07/17/upshot/drug-overdose-deaths-fall.html
[https://perma.cc/LL5V-PC7C]
(noting that, although overdose deaths have decreased, much of that decrease is due to limits
on opioid painkiller prescribing; whereas overdoses related to other drugs, such as fentanyl,
have continued to increase).
283
See Sutter et al., supra note 89, at 63, 65 (describing community harms associated with
public injection drug use, such as increased secondary infections and syringe litter).
284
See, e.g., Health Alert, Phila. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, Hepatitis A Increases in Philadelphia:
Considerations for Diagnosis, Control, and Prevention (June 12, 2018),
https://hip.phila.gov/Portals/_default/HIP/HealthAlerts/2018/PDPH-HAN_Alert_7_Hep
AIncrease_06122018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSX2-874Q] (noting an increase to 26 cases of
Hepatitis A in the recent twelve-month period compared to an average rate of 6 cases annually between 2012 and 2016).
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public disorder,285 rather than abate it.286 Recent research suggests that public
opinion in the most affected neighborhoods is shifting in favor of SCFs.287
Social and political momentum is necessary but not sufficient to
reform. There must be policy alternatives once limitations with traditional
first-line approaches emerge. Drug policy in the United States has seldom
offered such policy options in the last century. But the dynamics of drug policy
are changing. Political scientists have often described policy reform in terms
of punctuated equilibrium, meaning that in most regulatory domains there are
long periods of stability and that when change happens, it is violent and
revolutionary.288 Legal reform related to marijuana fits the pattern, as do
realignments in drug policy more generally. As Philadelphians confront an
entrenched opioid crisis, well-funded corporations in the suburbs are managing
pot farms for medical dispensing,289 and recreational use is likely not far

285

See, e.g., Nina Feldman, Kensington Neighbors Angered by Potential Location of Supervised Injection Site, WHYY (Mar. 27, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/kensington-neighbors-angered-by-potential-location-of-supervised-injection-site/ [https://perma.cc/8C8YTREP] (describing how community members “expressed fear that a supervised injection facility would increase crime and keep drug dealers and drug use stuck in” their neighborhood);
Kilpatrick, supra note 140 (describing one resident’s worry that “a safe-injection site in the
neighborhood will cause more violence as dealers fight for corners surrounding the site”
although studies on safe injection sites in Canada and Australia found no increase in crime
in the surrounding areas).
286
See NEIL DONNELLY & NICOLE MAHONEY, N.S.W. BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND
RESEARCH, TRENDS IN PROPERTY AND ILLICIT DRUG CRIME AROUND THE MEDICALLY
SUPERVISED INJECTING CENTRE IN KINGS CROSS: 2012 UPDATE 8 (2013) (finding, in a study
spanning over a decade, “no evidence that [an Australian SCP] had a negative impact on
property crime and little evidence that it had an adverse impact on drug use and dealing” in
the surrounding neighborhood).
287
See, e.g., Alexis M. Roth et al., Overdose Prevention Site Acceptability among Residents
and Businesses Surrounding a Proposed Site in Philadelphia, USA, 96 J. URB. HEALTH
341, 344 (2019) (finding that 90% of individuals in Kensington, PA, the neighborhood with
the highest drug-overdose mortality in Philadelphia, favor opening an SCF in that area).
288
Political scientists brought this theory over from biology. See, e.g., James L. True, Bryan
D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and
Change in Public Policymaking, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 155, 180 n.1 (Paul A.
Sabatier ed., 2d ed. 2007) (noting that the punctuated equilibrium theory was imported from
evolutionary biology). See generally Stephen J. Gould & Niles Eldredge, Review Article, Punctuated Equilibrium Comes of Age, 366 NATURE 223 (1993) (describing the emergence and
ultimate validation of punctuated equilibrium in the evolutionary research).
289
See John George, The Region’s First Medical Marijuana Grower Expects Its First Harvest
Soon—and Is Already Expanding, PHILA. BUS. J. (Aug. 30, 2019, 7:37 AM), https://
www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2019/08/30/the-regions-first-medical-marijuanagrower-expects.html [https://perma.cc/4BGY-VK3J] (describing four corporations that grow and
process medical marijuana in Philadelphia and its surrounding suburbs).
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off.290 This is not to suggest that irony or hypocrisy will provide any discipline
in political or judicial discourse; we are not so naive. Rather, it demonstrates
that drug control reforms have moved into the laboratories of the states, which
produce evidence to support and accelerate ongoing legislative changes.291
These legislative developments may encounter judicial roadblocks.
The Roberts Court may ultimately weigh in on SCFs if the Safehouse decision
reaches the Supreme Court, but courts are unlikely to provide the final or
determinative word. While the Raich decision appeared to be a victory for
federal regulation of marijuana, the effects of the ruling withered almost
immediately.292 Practically speaking, the Raich decision never reached adolescence; medical and recreational marijuana use was minimally affected in
California, which now has the largest legal marijuana market in the world,293
and recreational marijuana use came to Colorado, the first of many states, less
than a decade later.294 The history of the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative
(OCBC) provides a better example of how little judicial outcomes matter in
the face of secular changes in perceptions about drugs and associated willingness
of localities to engage in consistent policy experiments.295 There is plenty of

290

See Associated Press, Gov. Tom Wolf Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana in Pennsylvania, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania/
pennsylvania-legalize-marijuana-governor-tom-wolf-20190925.html [https://perma.cc/
8V38-FL9P] (“Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf is now in favor of legalizing marijuana for recreational use, saying . . . that most of the state’s residents support it and that the state has a
wealth of knowledge from the experience in other states to guide it.”).
291
See generally Burris & Anderson, supra note 145 (noting that in regulatory domains in
which states use their authority to experiment, there typically follows a process of policy
learning in which innovations beget research opportunities, which incrementally enrich the
understanding of underlying problems and point to paths for future refinement or retirement
of legal interventions).
292
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces Formal Medical Marijuana Guidelines (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announcesformal-medical-marijuana-guidelines [https://perma.cc/X27K-CZ6Q] (“It will not be a priority to use federal resources to prosecute patients with serious illnesses or their caregivers
who are complying with state laws on medical marijuana . . . .”).
293
See Patrick McGreevy, California Now Has the Biggest Legal Marijuana Market in the
World. Its Black Market Is Even Bigger, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-14/californias-biggest-legal-marijuana-market
[https://perma.cc/7X9Q-4J23] (reporting that California is expected to post $3.1 billion in
licensed marijuana sales for 2019, nearly twice those projected in Colorado and considerably
more than in other countries).
294
See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §16.
295
OCBC provided marijuana to patients who complied with California laws authorizing
medical use. The federal government issued an injunction halting OCBC’s activity, which
was upheld by the Supreme Court despite reasonable arguments that marijuana was medically necessary to prevent considerable harm. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Code §11362.5
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reason to doubt that experiences with marijuana generalize to injection drugs.
Yet we think that the mechanics broadly transfer across state and federal policy,
with more open-minded thinking on marijuana likely to support saner, evidencebased reform in other areas.296
Broader contemplation and implementation of legislative reforms
should extend to federal regulation of treatment for substance use disorder.
The registration and waiver laws and regulations are a product of earlier and
different eras, and they have persisted because of receding dynamics. When
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Webb in 1919,297 the medical profession
was still weak therapeutically and politically. It was only four years after
the dean of the Harvard Medical School had said: “For the first time in history, .
. . [a patient] stands a better than 50/50 chance of benefiting from a [clinical]
encounter.”298 But for most of the following decades, the medical profession
has been good at both treatment and influencing national policy.299 Physicians
have become so powerful, in fact, that they, like most powerful interests, have
tended not to question problems in the status quo that they could avoid, even
if they had strong opinions purely on the merits.300 This is what Paul Starr

(West 2019) (authorizing the medical use of marijuana in California); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001). It remains a disappointing result
(in allowing law enforcement to define medical practice), but practically irrelevant; despite
its defeat, OCBC has issued over 100,000 medical marijuana ID cards in California. Cannabis Badges, PATIENT ID CTR., http://www.cannabisbadges.com/index.php/patient-id-card
[https://perma.cc/B44H-LHLW] (last visited Sept. 18, 2019). It is now known as the Patient
ID Center, or PIDC. Mission Statement, PATIENT ID CTR., https://www.patientidcenter.
org/index.php/mission-statement (last visited Sept. 18, 2019).
296
See Sanders, supra note 12 (describing Bernie Sanders’s support for SCFs); Warren, supra
note 12 (describing Elizabeth Warren’s support for SCFs).
297
See Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1919) (holding that issuing an order for
maintenance of a habitual morphine user “would be so plain a perversion of meaning” of a
physician’s prescription that it cannot be considered as such).
298
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR ON
GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER 45 (2016) (quoting
Harvard Medical School Professor Lawrence Henderson).
299
See STARR, supra note 144, at 285 (detailing the AMA’s campaign against universal healthcare, which linked it to failed socialist policies, scuttling its passage on more than one occasion).
300
This is evident in the medical industry’s ongoing battle against surprise billing reform in
California. See Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, In California, a ‘Surprise’ Billing Law
Is Protecting Patients and Angering Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/09/26/upshot/california-surprise-medical-billing-law-effects.html [https://
perma.cc/KMZ7-8PJ4] (describing the battle between patient advocacy groups and physicians and physician staffing firms to control the narrative regarding California’s recent
“surprise billing” law limiting out-of-network payments for care in in-network facilities).
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calls a Policy Trap.301 Groups or individuals with privilege seldom put their
privilege on the line for principle, if they can avoid it, when the potential
downside far outweighs any potential personal upside. For example, Medicare
for All sounds great in principle, but if your insurance is employer-based,
your support is likely more conceptual than actual. Evidence-based treatment for
people with OUD—and especially for the most marginalized—sounds great in
theory, but getting physicians to demand it in the face of law enforcement
opposition was always a big ask when the benefits for physicians were small.
But the dynamics here have changed, too. Opioids are commonly
dispensed, and while their dispensing sometimes does more harm than good,
the best evidence suggests that they can be essential for addressing disabling
pain in many people.302 The threat of regulatory sanctions for overprescribing
has been exaggerated historically, with law enforcement actions limited
generally to brazen or incompetent conduct far beyond the scope of reasonable practice.303 Today, however, the DEA is casting a much wider net.
Diane Hoffmann provides a compelling account of a number of prosecutions
of physicians whose prescribing was reasonable if not exemplary, based on
assessments from other medical experts.304 Providers would understandably
feel uncomfortable treating pain with opioids in this climate, especially with
patients for whom pain co-occurs with OUD.305 Prescribers are still reluctant
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PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER
HEALTH CARE REFORM 122-23 (2011) (using the example of healthcare financing to describe
the concept of a policy trap in the sense that many older Americans like Medicare enough
and many affluent Americans like their employer-based insurance plans enough to not want
to support healthcare reform that would probably, but not definitely, improve the status quo).
302
See Dowell et al., supra note 206 (encouraging the balancing of the risks of opioid
prescribing with the benefits of their use for treatment of chronic and acute pain).
303
See generally, e.g., Peggy Eastman, Fear of Prosecution for Prescribing Opioids Exaggerated, Law Study Concludes: Growing Sophistication by the States Leading to Leniency,
25 ONCOLOGY TIMES , no. 11, at 62 (2003) (“Physicians overestimate their level of
regulatory scrutiny when they use opioids legitimately in aggressive pain management.”); Donald M. Goldenbaum et al., Physicians Charged with Opioid AnalgesicPrescribing Offenses, 9 PAIN MED . 737 (2008) (noting that criminal and administrative
charges for overprescribing opioids are rare and that pain specialists are no more likely
than other providers to face prosecution).
304
Hoffmann, supra note 177, at 239-56.
305
Many physicians have described practicing defensively and skeptically given the
threat of prosecution. See, e.g., Karina M. Berg et al., Providers’ Experiences Treating Chronic Pain Among Opioid-Dependent Drug Users, J. GEN . INTERNAL MED . 482,
484 (2009); Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in
Oversight of Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical
Boards, 31 J. L., MED . & ETHICS 21, 21-40 (2003) (noting that some physicians inadequately prescribe opioids due to fear of regulatory scrutiny and potential disciplinary
action, which leads to immense suffering for their patients with serious pain).
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to prescribe buprenorphine as a maintenance agent, partly because it consistently
gets diverted when prescribed.306
In the minds of providers faced with such patients, their hands are
tied: they could be sued for abandonment if they refuse to treat patients as
they believe (and as evidence indicates) is proper or they might be prosecuted
for overprescribing or contributing to drug diversion. While this is a false
dichotomy, even in this era of intensified law enforcement oversight, the
real possibility of either prospect occurring is enough to intrude on the normal
functioning of the physician-patient relationship. The DEA has always policed
medicine from a law enforcement—rather than patient care—perspective,307 but
physicians have also provided a vacuum by failing to vigorously regulate
themselves308 or to strenuously defend evidence-based interventions. We
expect providers to flex more of their political muscle, collateral benefits to drug
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See generally Jennifer J. Carroll, Josiah D. Rich & Traci Green, The More Things
Change: Buprenorphine/naloxone Diversion Continues While Treatment Remains Inaccessible, 12 J. ADDICTION MED . 459 (2018) (finding that the use of diverted buprenorphine remains common among people who use opioids non-medically); Theodore J.
Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis & Howard D. Chilcoat, Understanding the Use of Diverted
Buprenorphine, 193 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 117 (2018) (conducting a medical
study to understand diversion of buprenorphine within an adult population).
307
See generally Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen's Race:
Medical Marijuana in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV . 673 (2009) (describing
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Misuse, Abuse, and Overdose: Many Opportunities, Few Requirements, 163 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 100, 100-07 (2016) (finding that continuing medical education can
help improve medical and provider knowledge to guard against overprescribing of opioids);
Corey S. Davis & Derek Carr, Physician Continuing Education to Reduce Opioid Misuse,
Abuse, and Overdose: Many Opportunities, Few Requirements, 163 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 100, 100-07 (2016) (finding that continuing medical education can help improve medical and provider knowledge to guard against overprescribing of opioids); Corey
S. Davis et al., Laws Limiting the Prescribing or Dispensing Of Opioids for Acute Pain in
the United States: A National Systematic Legal Review, 194 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
166, 166-72 (2019) (finding that just over half of all states have enacted laws that restrict the
prescribing or dispensing of opioids for acute pain); Nathan Guevremont, Mark Barnes &
Claudia E. Haupt, Physician Autonomy and the Opioid Crisis, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 203,
203-19 (2018) (discussing the limitations on physician autonomy related to opioids and
impacts of opioid-specific regulations the patient-physician relationships).
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policy, as pressure on prescribers broadens and deepens.309 Without this evidence-based precision, the pendulum will continue to swing broadly and harmfully.
CONCLUSION
In the effort to reduce overdose morbidity and mortality, we must
do more to address underlying pain among those most at risk. DOT-P is a
reasonable, scientifically supported intervention that will improve the lives of
the most marginalized people with OUD: those with co-occurring pain.
Considerable evidence suggests that DOT-P will also benefit the communities
in which injection drug use occurs in public. Federal law enforcement has
challenged other similarly evidence-based interventions recently (e.g., SCFs)
and in the past (e.g., syringe exchanges). However, DOT-P falls clearly
within the bounds of professional practice. Clinicians in the United States
retain broad authority to use opioids in the treatment of pain, including when that
pain co-occurs with OUD. A plain reading of the CSA supports practitioners’
leeway in this area, as do congressional intent and constitutional principles.
While DOT-P is an incremental innovation in the United States, this country’s
history with narcotics use and states’ willingness to push federal boundaries
indicate that DOT-P’s implementation is inevitable, and help may soon be on
the way for thousands of people in need of evidence-based treatment.

309
But let us be plain: problems with opioids also reflect deeper problems in healthcare delivery.
A healthcare system that privileges volume of services will always produce incidental harm
(think: overprescribing) and fail to adequately support people with the greatest unmet needs,
especially when those needs cannot be addressed exclusively by highly reimbursable
technological solutions like precision medicine. While we expect physicians to respond to
the current moment, health institutions are enormously cumbersome and slow to change.
Institutional medicine seems incapable of focusing on the things that work (e.g., investments
in the social determinants of health, etc.) rather than the moonshots that pay (e.g., proton
therapy, immunotherapy, etc.).

